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ABSTRACT
The incremental model of planning is discussed. Some obvious short-
comings are noted. The model is found to assume that the world functions as a
single, complex machine. The method of planning is seen as uncovering the
workings of enough of the machine to enable instrumental actions. Failure to
successfully operationalize this model seem to recommend the building of larger
models to better simulate the machine.
The mechanistic model is discussed in greater detail as it relates to the
goal of management. Two potential limitations of the model are identified. One,
having to do with the limitations of atomistic logic, is not pursued further due to
a lack of a means of grasping the issue. The issue of human behavior in the
mechanistic description is related to the distinction between subject and object in
our grammatical structure. The subject causes, the object is caused, dependent.
It is hypothesized that when dealing with people, treating them as obj ects will be
found to have different consequences than treating them as subjects, capable of
independently initiating action. These consequences will have relevance to plan-
ning goals.
Empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis is presented from locus of
control research in the field of psychology. The research deals with the distinc-
tion between the individual perceiving himself as the object of events external to
himself and perceiving himself as the subject of his own life's events. The weight
of the evidence strongly suggest that life is felt to be better where people perceive
themselves as capable of acting as subjects in their life events as opposed to being
mere objects, whose actions and experiences are dictated by other persons or
events.
The discussionl is extended to John Dewey's descriptions of experience and
growth, Karl Marx's description of alienation, and the existentialist view of vitality.
Further ethical notions on determinism as described by Jiirgen Habermas are
discussed.
The final chapter discusses several cases of planning situations and actions
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"Is it immoral for one man to decide what is good for
another, and to influence decision makers to make the 'appropriate'
changes? I take this to be a meaningful and serious question. .
Although the question is addressed to all those who devote part of
their lives to changing society 'for the good', politicians, managers,
administrators, and demonstrators, I'll single out one such group,
the planners, for special attention, since planners work through
ideas, and this essay is essentially an exploration of ideas.
(Churchman, 1977, p. 165)
INTRODUCTION
I view my planning background as being in many ways that of a technician.
I have learned many tools and methods for solving specific problems, achieving
specific goals. But I have never really understood where the goals come from.
For some time now I have pondered the question of how problems are defined, how
the agenda for planning comes into being. I have not found any satisfactory
answers to these questions. But many issues, relevant to these questions, have
come to my attention. Over time, many of the ideas have coalesced into the
arguments presented in this thesis.
I began this thesis as a project in applying basic philosophy to a critique of
planning theory. The purpose was to make planners more aware of the signifi-
cances and consequences of the models they use. My belief was that the theories
and models used by planners were not simple, value-neutral tools which could be
applied to any purpose or intent. They were themselves embodiments of intentions
and values which would serve to perpetuate and give validity to those values and
intentions when used by policy makers. The result was that planners were impos-
ing values, without even realizing they were doing so. The field of philosophy, as
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the study of ideas, was the logical place to turn to for a means of revealing some
of the underlying assumptions and values in planning theory.
The mental model which is most characteristic of planning today is incre-
mentalism. This is usefully understood as following from pragmatism, the social
philosophy from which incrementalism borrows its method. Incrementalism entails
bounding the world, limiting activities to the manageable. In the first chapter I
discuss the incremental model and the problems it seeks to address. -The data
approach of incrementalism may be better understood by a reference to the dis-
cursive approach in logic which is explained in Appendix One and limitations on
reasoning imposed by Logical Positivism, explained in Appendix Two. The entire
approach views the world as mechanistic, functioning as a single, complex machine.
The method of planning is seen as uncovering the workings of enough of the machine
to manage its functioning through instrumental action. Failure to successfully
operationalize this model dictates the limited approach of incrementalism and seems
to recommend the building of larger models to better simulate the machine.
Although some obvious limitations of incrementalism are discussed in the
first chapter, a more fundamental critique of its underpinning, the mechanistic
model, is presented in Chapter Two. The question which is pursued is whether the
failures of the management ideal might be more fundamental than simply not having
identified the perfect mechanistic model. Two potential shortcomings of the
mechanistic model are identified. One, having to do with the limitations of atom-
istic logic, is not pursued further due to the lack of a means of grasping the issue.
The other, the issue of whether or not human behavior is mechanistic in the sense
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of the ideal model, is investigated further. The nature of mechanistic descriptions
is clarified as involving the distinction between subject and object in our grammat-
ical structure. The subject causes, the object is caused. A hypothesis to be
tested is then determined to be that the distinction between subject and object, when
used in describing people and their behavior, is significant to planning, that differ-
ent outcomes derive from different descriptions and the actions based on those
descriptions. The method of testing will be to seek evidence linking the distinction
to commonly valued planning goals. In particular, it will be contended that treating
people as objects, acting on theories which do so, can be shown to have undesirable
consequences in terms of planning goals.
Chapter Three presents empirical evidence. Whether a person perceives
his life as the object of events external to himself or perceives himself to be the
subject of his life's events is the topic of a rather substantial literature in the field
of psychology. Illustrative elements are presented from this literature. The
weight of the evidence strongly suggests that where people are treated as / view
themselves as subjects, life is better than where, all else being equal, people are
treated as / view themselves and their lives as objects.
Chapter Four attempts to broaden the implications of the hypothesis for
planning by connecting the subject-object distinction in viewing human behavior
to several major planning issues as described by philosophers and social theorists.
John Dewey's descriptions of experience and growth, Karl Marx' s description of
alienation, and the existentialist view of vitality are presented. Appendix Three
also contains a critique of Utilitarianism drawn from John Dewey and his critique
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of education which follows from it, which may be useful background for under-
standing Dewey's ideas on growth. An explicit expansion of Dewey's ideas on
growth is provided in Chapter Four. The last part of the chapter deals with a
discussion of determinism in human behavior and emancipation from determination
based on the work of Jtirgen Habermas. This last section is not developed in the
later discussion of planning applications but rather is presented as a moral counter
argument to the mechanistic model ideal. Habermas argues that where human
behavior is involved, we should strive to make the mechanistic model less applic-
able rather than more. In the social sciences, the mechanistic model relies on
unreflective behavior for its applicability. When persons are aware of the
functioning of the mechanistic model, they may choose to alter their predicted
relationships.
Chapter Five returns to the practice of planning in an attempt to apply
the construct of the hypothesis to planning issues and experience. A description
of the problems resulting from the present planning model is explained in terms of
the construct. A specific example of a planning action which had the described
consequences is explained. The implications of the construct are worked through
two hypothetical planning situations and three real cases are discussed. Finally,
a problem with the generalizability of the thesis is mentioned, indicating that while
it serves well to inform planning action, it cannot be accepted blindly as a rule.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE INCREMENTAL MODEL
The mental model which most characterizes planning as it is practiced
today is incrementalism. Incrementalism means proceeding by small steps
limited in time and scope. In this chapter this approach to planning will be
discussed. Additionally, some theoretical and practical problems related to
incrementalism and its adequacy for planning will be assessed.
The basic problem of planning, that which separates the real practice
from the ideal theory, is complexity. The reality confronted by planners is too
complex to allow for complete understanding and the identification of optimal
courses of action. To understand what complexity means, we may begin with
the essential situation, a planner and an environment. The planner, having inten-
tions to carry out some course of action within the environment (such as the
achievement of a planning goal), must have a means of understanding the environ-
ment for theorizing about hypothetical actions. He breaks his initial impression
of the environment into identifiable pieces or concepts (later to be seen as
variables or elements of commonality) for the purpose of abstract theorizing. He
further subdivides concepts until continued subdivision does not appear useful for
understanding the environment and carrying out intentions within it. (This process
of subdividing, which is known as the discursive approach, is discussed in greater
detail in Appendix One.) The planner must then identify relationships between and
among the pieces before he can use them as variables in models of action, manip-
ulation, and consequence.
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The problem of complexity arises from the fact that the human mind has a
limited capacity for conceptualizing individual elements simultaneously in relation
to each other. The planner is not able to consider the entire environment at the
level of detail he finds fruitful for the kinds of intentions he seeks to carry out. To
maintain a given level of detail, he must limit his view to a specific field within
the environment and to only certain aspects of that field. As an example, a planner
working for the sewer commission in the city of Cleveland might only be concerned
with those things defined as sewage found within the limits of the city of Cleveland.
This enables him to exclude the vast bulk of what could be thought about in the
greater environment. He need bring to his view only a technical knowledge con-
sisting of concepts relevant to the potential handling of sewage. He will then
manipulate these variables in his mind to yield a plan of action to do something
with the sewage which is not considered harmful.
The planner's view may also be limited in time, responding only to what is
happening immediately or what may be expected to happen in the near future. The
planner concerned with sewage may devise strategies to meet the demands for
sewage treatment predicted to occur within the next five years, ignoring possible
demands not anticipated until after that period.
This approach is pragmatism. As characterized by Harvey Cox, it is the
response of a secularized society which is turning away from "ultimate or religious
questions" and focusing concern on what are percieved to be more immediate
"problems", "settling for highly provisional solutions". (Cox, 1965) For the
pragmatist, the world is viewed not as a unified metaphysical system but as a series
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of Interrelated problems and projects. Even though solutions are limited in focus
and time, and may lead to a whole new set of problems, this is expected. It is
the course of progress. "That the pragmatist works on his problems one at a
time testifies to his belief in the order of things." (Cox, 1965, p. 57)
In recent times, the complexity of planning has been seen not only as a
problem in identifying manageable problems and workable solutions but also
undesirable consequences of actions. Following the pragmatic approach, Charles
E. Lindblom combined the narrowing of focus and temporal scope in his strategy
of incrementalism. By making numerous, successive small decisions aimed at
limited aspects of a problem, planners were seen to be able to use negative feed-
back between steps to more accurately attack problems and minimize undesired
consequences. The size of each step was determined by the scope of issue which
the planner can adequately understand. The incremental approach was presented
in contrast to a method Lindblom called "synoptic" because of the high degree of
synopsis or comprehensiveness of view. Lindblom asserted that the synoptic
ideal was unattainable. "Between incompleteness because of neglect of conse-
quences and incompleteness because of an aspiration toward comprehensiveness
that cannot in fact be satisfied, the former is not necessarily more alarming.
Decision makers must choose between errors of omission and errors of confusion.
In many circumstances a decision maker comes to terms with his own abilities and
available information when he turns from an analysis so complex that he will
bungle it to a simpler analysis that, even is incomplete, can be done well within its
limits. " (Lindblom, 1965, p. 144)
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As an example of this strategy, we might consider the situation of a planner
working for a public transit authority. A planner taking the synoptic view would
conduct numerous route destination, traffic density, transit useage, parking, land
use, and public opinion surveys to build a complete picture of the movement of
goods and people throughout the city, the purposes of trips, the anticipated changes,
and the motivational factors involved in trip and mode of transit selection. Then
the planner would design a complete set of transit routes and schedules, fare
structures, park-and-ride facilities, kiss-and-ride services, and in-town parking
restrictions all culminating in a more efficient system of transportation for the city.
The incremental planner would move one step at a time. The fare structure could
be changed. Depending on the experience further fare changes might be made or
remade. An express service would be instituted on a certain line. It might later
be extended, rerouted, or discontinued. A new route might be added. An old one
would be discontinued. A special bus for the handicapped would be provided. A
park-and-ride facility might be built on a major highway. After initial assessment
it might be connected to a nearby suburb by a dial-a-ride service. Each step
involves only a minor commitment, does not require extensive study, does not
cause major disruptions in existing behavior patterns, can be easily assessed, and
can be modified in the next step. Other steps may be tailored according to the
experience of earlier steps. The system evolves as the situation confronted
changes and as new innovations prove successful.
March and Simon (1958) note that even within well-bounded problems optimal
solutions might be difficult and costly to identify. They propose that beyond some
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point, the cost of searching for the optimal solution cannot be justified by the
potential advantages it might have over other, already identified solutions. In
place of optimization, a policy of satisficing is suggested. This procedure involves
setting standards for a satisfactory solution and, depending on the cost of searching
for better solutions, settling for a solution which meets the criteria of satisfaction.
In this way, the sewage planner mentioned earlier establishes criteria for a non-
harmful solution to the problem of sewage disposal. He does not seek the best use
or treatment of sewage. The cost of a technology search and assessment to
consider recycling separators, sludge fertilizers, radiation sterilization, energy
producing methods of burning, fuel creating fermentation, solar powered purifiers,
or other new technologies, would not be justified by the benefits derivable for the
town. He will most likely end up seeking to dispose of it by the least harmful
means within a given cost range. For most towns this will mean using the most
readily available, commonly used technology.
To summarize the pragmatic, incremental, satisficing approach to
problems: the environment is seen to be too complex to be considered all at once.
Changes in the environment are not well enough understood to make specific plans
for eventualities far distant in the future. Even specific problems may be too
complex for optimal solutions to be easily identified. Problems are to be identified
one at a time. The focus of each individual problem-addressing, solution-finding
effort is narrowed. If possible, problems are further broken into sub-problems
addressable one at a time. Provisional, sub-optimal solutions are accepted where
the cost of further improvement is high.
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The criterion which is used in selecting an appropriate scale or scope for
problem-addressing is control. Though Lindblom says 'understand' rather than
'control', understanding means the ability to describe in such a way that instru-
mental manipulation is made possible. It is this criterion which determines the
appropriate scale of issues addressed as indicated by a choice of errors of"
"omission" over errors of "confusion". The implications of this intention will
be discussed in the next chapter.
Is the incremental approach workable? What are its weaknesses? Can
problems be successfully isolated from the broader context? The incrementalism
and pragmatism described by Lindblom and Cox takes its cues from the scientific
method where experiments are conducted on phenomena isolated from or controlling
for surrounding factors. However, the social sciences have proven more resistant
to this approach. Social phenomena may be said to be context-dependent. Decision
makers encounter the same kinds of problems in trying to isolate areas for consid-
eration. The method entails isolating systems from a more complex constellation
of events by drawing artificial boundaries. Thus, effects which cross these
artificial boundaries are, for one or another reasda, considered relatively unim-
portant. This method of problem design was discussed by Chris Alexander in
Notes on the Synthesis of Form (1964). In economics, costs which occur outside a
boundary drawn to include only market interactions are called externalities. In
industrial processes, events which had not been anticipated in the original calcula-
tions focused only on production (because burning coal produces more than heat) are
called byproducts or pollution.
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In this same way, public policy derived from similarly simplified theories
(social or technical) results in unanticipated and often undesirable consequences
or side effects. There is an analogous story about this issue called "The Monkey's
Paw". The monkey's paw is a stuffed hunting trophy which enables its possessor
to have his wishes fulfilled. In the story, the new owners discover that indeed
their wishes are fulfilled, but always under the most horrible circumstances.
Lindblom would respond that no theory is good enough to avoid the problem
of unwanted side effects. In fact, the theory of incrementalism explicitly suggests
that by taking small steps the consequences of each action will be likewise small
and, if important enough, can be addressed in the next step. It is, of course,
assumed that in each action the gains outweigh the costs (a problem of cost-benefit
analysis) and therefore we should find ourselves confronting progressively smaller
and fewer problems.
A danger here is assuming that consequences will be minor. Natural
processes which concentrate previously trace quantities of pesticides are a good
example of such unanticipated dangers. The cost of removing those pesticides
from the environment, if at all feasible, would be prohibitive. Cancer is another
case. We now realise that the incidence of cancer and heart disease is related
to many changes in our diets and social living situations which have taken place
over a long period of time. We may find that the only rational solutions to some of
our problems are to undo some of our earlier solutions. Our commitment to or
dependence on some of those earlier solutions may make such remedial action
difficult.
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The incremental approach has obvious appeal to decision makers in
bureaucratic positions. They make only small decisions unlikely to draw partic-
ular attention and unlikely to risk noticeable errors. The problems that do arise
will grow over a period of time and be difficult to trace to any specific decisions.
They will just be tomorrow's business. However, this also leads one into a situ-
ation commonly called crisis management or management by exception. The
decision maker responds to immediate problems rather than a vision of a better
tomorrow. It is, as Lindblom suggests, "not surprising that public problem sol-
ving is also dominated less by aspiration toward a well defined future state than by
identified social ills that seem to call for remedy. Thus problem solving will be
directed toward the suppression of vice even if virtue is not defined, will be con-
cerned with mental illness even if we are not clear as to just what is healthy, will
be bent on curbing the expansion of the Soviet Union even if we do not know what
positive objectives in foreign policy to set against the Soviet's objectives. The
decision maker does not wholly turn his back on such general aspirations as liberty,
economic growth, or justice; but he makes these abstractions less dominant in his
analysis than particular imperfections which he wishes to remove. The simplifica-
tion of immediate problems achieved by focus on the remedial ill is obvious. "
(Lindblom, 1965, p. 147) But the remediation of the obvious may itself be a serious
error. An extreme example of this is found in the statement byanAir Force general
in Vietnam, "We had to bomb the village in order to save it.
More to the point, businesses are literally drowning in minor regulations
which must be complied with and forms which must be completed and submitted.
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It seems that every time a bureaucratic agency finds an issue or a potential
issue, it enacts a regulation to deal with that issue. A recent ad for Bethlehem
Steel complained that they confront 5,600 separate regulations from 27 federal
agencies pertaining to the making of steel alone. Similarly, developers cannot
afford to hold undeveloped property for the length of time often required to clear
the numerous hurdles of getting required permits. Much of the research and de-
velopment money invested in the auto industry is devoted to complying with regu-
lations, many <f which change every year as priorities change and problems are
redefined.
Another problem which incrementalism does not escape occurs when the
definition of a problem and possible solutions take certain things as given, such as
the economic superstructure, the use of technology, or the availability of abundant
energy. The solutions prescribed often depend on the continuing existence of these
givens. Pragmatism is especially prone to this problem. When an issue is iso-
lated, everything else is held constant, accepted as given, while only aspects of the
isolated issue are considered variable. For example, many of our solutions to
pollution require large amounts of energy. In the previously mentioned example of
cancer, it is interesting to note that a recent Congressional hearing (June 13, 1978)
revealed that 95% of the federal funds allocated for cancer research have been spent
on finding new cures while only 5% has been spent on preventions such as identifying
dietary links. Aside from the obvious remedial disposition of the research, the
assumption that modern technology can solve everything continues to make us more
dependent on its gadgets rather than less dependent (more independent as indiviual
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human beings). Similarly, our attempts to help third world nations develop by
offering the benefits of our technologies and advice based on models devised in
our own advanced economies seems to make them dependent on our own advanced
technologies which they themselves cannot reproduce. These countries experi-
ence social transformations which have more to do with the adoption of Western
ways than the indigenous social fabric.
John Friedmann provided an example of the experience of planners in the
early stages of communism in the Soviet Union. Rather than trying to control
the economy indirectly through manipulations of the credit market and similar
policies as practiced in this country, they decided that direct control would be
much more effective. However;
"One of the least expected consequences of the extensive use of
direct economic controls was the necessity it created for coercive
measures in many related facets of life. To make the Soviet
system work, jobs, location, housing, and consumption had all to
be regulated according to a plan, and, as domestic criticism
mounted, thought control had to be added. " (Friedmann, 1973, p. 3 7)
Although the initial decision was not incremental, the subsequent incremental
decisions which assumed the usefulness of direct control, made extensive use of
direct control necessary for the survival of the state.
The most telling example for our purposes is provided by incrementalism
itself. By instituting numerous ad hoc solutions in response to what is perceived
to be a constellation of numerous minor problems, as in taxes, welfare, govern-
ment organizations and almost everywhere else, decision makers increase the
complexity of situations whose perceived complexity led them to settle for incre-
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mentalism as an expedient in the first place. An analogy for these examples
may be found in the plight of an insect caught in a spider's web.
Rittel and Weber present a more fundemental criticism of the incremental
approach, that it is superficial and may impede meaningful solutions. The prag-
matic police chief will see the problem of crime in the streets as needing more
policemen and better hardware rather than as a sjmitom ofdeeper social ills. Treat-
ing the most obvious symptom is considered a low level of problem formulation.
Seeking more fund mental roots of a problem involves a higher level of problem
formulation. "The higher the level of a problem's formulation, the broader and
more general it becomes: and the more difficult it becomes to do something about
it. On the other hand, one should not try to cure symptoms-. and therefore one
should try to settle the problem on as high a level as possible. " (Rittel and Weber,
1975, p. 165) In this view, incrementalism will just keep stepping on fires without
ever getting to their cause. As we saw in the earlier examples, the dependence of
incremental solutions may make more fundemental change more difficult and more
disruptive.
It would seem that what is needed is the taking of a broader view. Even if
a significant level of detail can be achieved only in a limited field, the decision
maker should devote some attention to the broader context within which the issue
is found and search for the broader implications of possible solutions. Sometimes
the broad view reveals the consequences of innumerable little decisions and indi-
cates a more valuable course of actions. The idea of zero based budgeting came
from the observation of proliferating government programs proceeding without
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idea of consequence. Not long ago, the director of state planning in Massa-
chusetts observed that the state government, through countless minor admini-
strative decisions, was a major contributor to urban blight and sprawl. Ad-
ministrators looking only at immediately relevant costs were locating important
government offices and service facilities on cheap land outside of the state's
urban centers, not noticing that those centers depended for their lives on the
mutual support of a varity of services which attract people.
This approach is not ideal. While it is an improvement over blind incre-
mentalism, the problem of complexity- still remains. How else can we deal with
this complexity ?
Another approach has been through the use of mathematical models along
with computers. Through the use of mathematics, planners are able to describe
relationships between thousands of variables, simulate possible outcomes of
complex events, and draw gneralizations from hundreds or thousands. of individ-
ual events. Mathematical modeling and forecasting is widely applied to most
areas of planning. Along with the mathematical models have come several model-
ing techniques borrowed from the natural sciences, most notably systems analysis
and operations research.
But even with the ability to consider millions of variables, we are not able
to accurately model the planning environment. The problem appears to involve
our inability to accurately define the relationships between and among variables.
This problem is especially acute where human behavior is involved. Our present
models seem too rigid for the events they seek to emulate. Are the relationships
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described in our models too simplistic? Is it that we just aren't specifying
enough variables, describing events in enough detail? Are our initial assumptions
about the problem of complexity adequate? We can attempt to deal 'with these
problems by making our models bigger and more detailed. Alternatively, we
could reassess our definition of the problem and our approach to it.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE MECHANISTIC MODEL
A problem may be described as the discrepancy between a situation as it
is seen to be and the situation as ones thinks it ought to be, between the real and
the ideal. In the previous chapter I described the major problem of planning as
the environment being too complex for the ideal of planning to be realized. In the
form described above, I could say that the real situation is seen to be incompre-
hendably complex while the ideal situation desired is one that is comprehendable
and manageable. Rittel and Weber (1973) characterize the real situation con-
fronted by planners as "wicked" in contrast to the ideal situation which is de-
scribed as "tame".
In assessing this problem formulation, we must consider both the descrip-
tion of the real and the idea of the ideal. The two, however, cannot be viewed
independently. How a situation is described is dependent on and embodies in-
tentions for actions relative to that which is described. A language syntax is very
much like a vending machine. It has a set of knobs which are user activated. The
extent of what you can do with the machine is limited by the selection indicated
by the knobs, by the syntax of the machine. "The ahoice of syntax and vocabulary
is a political act that defines and circumscribes the manner in which 'facts' are to
be experienced. Indeed, in a sense it goes farther and even creates the facts that
are studied... " (Laing, 1967, p. 62)
Remembering the intention of control and the statement that the pragmatic,
incremental approach takes its cues from the scientific method, we may have a key
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to understanding the intentions of the language of planning. Jtirgen Habermas
stated in Knowledge and Human Interest;
"There are three categories of processes of inquiry for which
a specific connection between logical-methodologic al rules and
knowledge-constitutive interests can be demonstrated. . . . The
approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a
technical cognitive interest; that of the historic-hermeneutic
sciences incorporates a practical one; and the approach of
critically oriented sciences incorporate the emancipatory
cognitive interest... " (Habermas, 1971, p. 3 08)
The critically oriented sciences seek to demonstrate the limitations, the
weaknesses of theories. To this end they commonly use the dialectic approach.
The hermeneutic sciences, i. e. history and anthropology, view other events in
terms of the interpreters own preunderstanding, his intitial situation. "...mean-
ing discloses itself to the interpreter only to the extent that his own world becomes
clarified at the same time. " (Habermas, 1971, p. 310)
The purpose of the empirical-analytic sciences, the natural sciences
commonly refered to as science, is control. . .. the logical structure of admiss-
able systems of propositions and the type of conditions for corroboration suggest
that theories of the empirical sciences disclose reality subject to the constitutive
interest in the possible securing and expansion, through information, of feedback-
monitored action. This is the cognitive interest in technical control over objecti-
fied processes." (Habermas, 1971, p. 309)
Consider the statements of Logical Positivism in the second appendix. Only
statements which can be empirically tested are considered meaningful, capable of
being real, true. How is a scientific proposition tested, validated? Tf, all other
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factors being controlled for, a sequence of events is repeated and the outcome
is the same, the proposition about a causal relationship of the events and out-
come is considered validated. That is, the proposition enables us to reliably
predict and or control. If the proposition does not enable accurate prediction,
it is considered invalid or meaningless.
In symbolic form a proposition has the form, 'if A then B,' whether indi-
cating that A leads to B or A has the quality B. Repeated observations of A then
B give the proposition credibility. An observation of A then not B renders the
proposition incorrect, not true. Control follows from prediction. If I can control
A, then I can control B where B follows from A.. The standard of repeatability of
sequential events without contradiction gains its significance from the intents of
prediction and control.
The arguments here applied to natural science, apply also to many aspects
of planning. The reason we use causal models is to find events over which we have
control with causal relationships to events over which we previously could not have
an effect or exercise control. Thus, in describing a set of causal relationships, we
seek to connect an event of interest through a causality tied chain of events to an
event over which we have control. This procedure is explained in the second stage,
analysis of system structure, of the planning process described by Krueckeberg and
Silvers;.
"Systems analysis takes the defined problem and structures a model
of the problem variables and their interrelationships, based on
gathered data and their careful analysis, to calibrate the effects of
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various control and change strategies on the goal and need variables.
(Krueckeberg and Silvers, 1974, p. 6)
The test of a good planner or manager is seen to be his ability to effect desired
outcomes.
Given our interest in effecting specific outsomes, we will choose the most
reliable method of achieving those goals. In Krueckeberg and Silver's planning
process stage 3, "Commitment must be made to a plan of changes expected to
achieve the goals in the most effective or efficient manner. " (Krueckeberg and
Silvers, 1974, p.4) We will choose to operate through the set of events with the
least likelihood of deviating from our intent, in other words, with the fewest un-
controlled, independent variables. We will choose to operate through closed
systems, through events modeled by closed models.
A closed system in its strictest sense is a system encompassing events all
of which causes are defined within the system. The degree of closedness is the
extent to which this is the case. An open system is open with respect to events which
are not defined (controlled) by the model and are therefore independent as opposed
to dependent on the other events within (controlled by) the system.
Is this process of inquiry into the nature of events reasonable? Does it have
any limitations or biases which we should be aware of? Are there any qualifications
we might wish to apply to it? If there are, might these qualifications affect our
descriptions of planning problems?
One limitation that can be identified stems from the nature of our logic,
specifically, its reliance on the law of identity. The process of analysis involves
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conceptually manipulating a system by rearranging its elements. The assump-
tion, taken for granted, is that each element itself remains unchanged as its
spatial and temporal relationships to other elements are altered. In essence,
each element represents a completely closed system. A completely closed system
is one that is self-defined (internally defined) rather than contexually defined (ex-
ternally defined). Our logic rests on the assumption of the existence of self-defined
elements. The first law of logic, Aristotle's law of identity, states that "A is A"
meaning that "A" is the same regardless of the context in which it appears or is
used; it is a self-defined element. This "conservation of identity" makes "each
element by itself a state of unchanging and static equilibrium with regard to its
essence or meaning. " (Burglass, 1971, p.14) Atomistic science is an obvious con-
sequence of this logic.*
In applying logic to experience, to real life situations, we must be aware
of the limitations, of the distortions imposed by its nature. Sartre ran into this
problem when he tried to explain the possible relationships between two people.
As long as he viewed each individual as being independently defined, their relation-
ship, as viewed by either one, must be that of subject and object, looking and being
looked at. By virtue of being independent they could not share the same experience
of one another, the same subjectivity. For a mutual consciousness, intersubjectiv-
ity, the individuals could no longer be independently defined. The only alternative
was that they be considered one in the same.
*The use of self-defined and independently defined elements is the issue of
Goedel's indeterminacy theorems.
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The same problem of the relationship between self-defined elements can
be found in discussions of political institutions when one asks, "tWhat is a demo-
cratic institution?" It is assumed that the form of the institution is what makes it
democratic, irrespective of the actors within it. The democratic institution is
itself seen as a closed system, as a determinant of democratic actions. The
United States' system of government is the actualization of a logical model designed
by the Founding Fathers (an embodiment of the Rationalist tradition is social think-
ing). In contrast, the British system, built up through centuries of tradition, lacks
our explicit network of checks and balances and relies more heavily on the
independent decision making and good will of individual actors.
A similar dilemma is confronted in discussions of citizens' involvement.
Again, the government is seen as a closed system and individuals as self-defined
entities are objects to the government. The question, built on these assumptions,
becomes, "How can citizens provide input to the system?" rather than "How might
citizens share in their own governing t?" Hence we have the creation of citizens
advisory councils, citizens review committees, and the like. These committees
themselves become part of the defined system and the dichotomy between citizen
and government remains sharp, the relationship subject-object. Interaction, as
with Sartre, is characterized by tension, conflict, dominance, and submission.
Yet another problem stemming from theories involving self-defined people
was indicated by John Dewey.
"When the self is regarded as something complete within
itself, then it is readily argued that only internal moralistic
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changes are of importance in general reform. Institutional
changes are said to be merely external. They may add con-
veniences and comforts to life, but they cannot effect moral
improvements. The result is to throw the burden for social
improvement upon free-will in its most impossible form.
Moreover, social and economic passivity are encouraged."
(Dewey, 1948, p. 196)
Personal improvement is seen to be completely internal. One's relationship with
the environment and with others might reflect the internal moral state, but are
not important to it. Moral improvement is subject only to one's own will. One's
experiences, how one is treated by others, the opportunities one has to act
according to one's own will, are not important.
"But when self-hood is perceived to be an active process, it
is also seen that social modifications are the only means of
changed personalities. . . .And inquiry into the meaning of
social arrangements gets definite point and direction."
(Dewey, 1948, p. 196)
Unfortunately, I have not found a method for consistently identifying the
consequences of this aspect of our logic, nor do I know of another form of logic
which avoids these biases. I must at present leave the specific problem of
"wholeism" and "atomism"to be puzzled over.
There is another problem, which may be imore susceptible to analysis,
which arises from the application of the intention of control and us e of mechan-
istic models in social situations, particularly where they are applied to people.
The intention of controlling the behavior of others raises serious moral questions.
Attempts to do so, as will be shown in the next chapter, have undersireable con-
sequences. The use of causal models leads to inaccurate descriptions of human
behavior. Human actions do not have efficient causes in the same sense as non-
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vital, natural phenomena. Human beings control their own actions, they have
their own purposes. They are subjects of their own actions. In the past,
planning theories have not taken specific note of this issue in discussing the use
of mechanistic models.
The problem does not always arise under explicit circumstances, where the
intention to dominate and control the behavior of others is overt. It may stem from
good management practices. It arises from the application of widely accepted
social science models. It follows from the application of modern logic and scien-
tific thought. In an attempt to root out its sources I will discuss the implications
of each.
To the manager, in the earlier open and closed system examples, interested
in effecting desired outcomes, other outputs may be tolerated if they do not affect
other defined goals, but other input which may affect the intended outcomes are
not tolerable. If the system devisedby the manager for the achievement of the
desired goals includes the actions of other individuals, they must act according to
the system model. Independent actions would be uncontrolled inputs to the system.
The factory manager may simply order his workers to do as they are told, not to
act independently, not to make their own decisions. The public manager may pro-
scribe behavior by law (e.g., trade laws designed to ensure the proper functioning
of the market), or seek to operate through ways in which behavior is found to be
dependent, potentially subject to indirect control. Allowing the system to be open
to other actors is not considered a good practice, where it can be avoided.
The manager interested in effecting desired outcomes chooses those circum-
stances which place in him, the chooser, the greatest control. He will seek
to centralize control within himself making the systems for which he is respons-
ible, to the greatest extent possible, open only to himself. Those under him may,
if necessary, be allowed to interpret his commands into greater detail, but not
to deviate from them or otherwise make independent inputs. This is consistent
with the tentative conclusions of David Noble's research on the development of
numerical control machine tools as a specific example of technological development.
Technological progress, at least in this case, has had the effect of increasing mana-
gerial control and decreasing the amount of knowledge and skill not under the control
of management. It is not surprising to see many examples of increasing centrali-
zation in decision making and control, both in private industry and in government.
As the ability to centralize control increases through improvements in computation
and communication, management will take advantage of it.
In the case of the social sciences, the problem of attributing mechanistic
behavior to people comes from trying to model the practice of social science after
the successful practices of the natural sciences. Natural scientists posit fixed
laws according to which the natural world is seen to behave. This renders natural
phenomena predictable and repeatable. By manipulating events which we can control
directly, we are able to affect other events to which the former are shown to be
causally linked. This model well describes the classic example of billiard balls
interacting through a series of collisions.
Social scientists, in seeking to emulate the natural sciences, bring us full
swing. Where man once sought to explain nature using models gained from under-
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standing vital man, they now seek to explain man using models gained from
understanding a non-vital nature. * In the latter view, choice is viewed as de-
termined, not free.
Here, social scientists want to confront a world where people behave ac-
cording to fixed laws which are for social science to identify and utilize in design-
ing policy. To the extent that people's behavior is fairly uniform (predictable) in
response to a given stimulus (cause) that stimulus will be identified and utilized
as a means of social control (i. e., pain, fear, money). B. F. Skinner's
Behavioral Psychology (stimulus-response) is the epitome of the social sciences'
trend toward a mechanistic view of man.
Though social scientists still view man's actions as being teleological and
purposeful, the tendency in sociological and psychological literature has been to
view such purposeful behavior in deterministic terms; relying on negative feedback.
Many articles have been devoted to the problem of giving a mechanistic account of
an act in terms of an event which is antecedent to it (or which in some cases has
never actually happened). The emphasis on expressing events in terms of other
empirically observable events, thus denying the "spiritual" half of dualistic philos-
ophy, can be traced to the growth of positivist philosophies discussed in Appendix
Two.
*Ancient Greek natural science was "based on the analogy between the macrocosm
nature and the microcosm man, as man is revealed to himself in his own self-
consciousness.... Renaissance natural science was based on the analogy between
nature as God's handiwork and the machines that are the handiwork of man. "
(Collingwood, 1945, p. 9)
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The assumption of mechanistic behavior is not just an attribute of
certain overtly chosen scientific models. It is a characteristic of the mode of
modern scientific explanation, a mode of explanation referred to as Galilean
logic, in contrast to the earlier Aristotelian logic. The former mode explains
events by reference to prior events, efficient causes, while the latter explains
events by reference to purposes, final causes. Galilean explanations are mechan-
istic, Aristotelean explanations are called teleological '(telos = end).
Aristotle, in trying to explain why a rock, when released, accelerated to-
ward the earth, stated that the rock was a thing of the earth, hence naturally tended
toward it. The rock became progressively more excited as it came nearer to home.
In this explanation, the rock is the subject of acceleration, the rock accelerates.
Newton observed the same phenomenon and asked the same question: "Why does the
rock fall?" Without observing anything new or different, Newton simply approached
the question with a different notion of causality. Why is the rock accelerated? Hence
he is said to have discovered gravity. The rock is now the object of acceleration.
With this reversal known as Galilean logic, modern science was born.
Neither explanation is true, per se. Both are simply forms of description within
our grammatical structure. However, they stem from different intentions, reflect
different theories of action, and lead to different conclusions. The idea of causal-
ity itself is a product of the sharp division of subject and predicate (rock/falling) -
a characteristic of our grammar inherited from the ancient Greek - without which
this particular question of why might never be asked.*
*The relationship between grammar and perception is discussed in Whorf, 1956. A
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If a police officer stops you on the turnpike for speeding, you need not ask
him whether he is Galilean or Aristotelean. He assumes that you are the subject
of your speeding and therefore personally responsible for your choice. A planner,
studying the issue of cars speeding on the turnpike, looks for causes external to you
of which you are the object. It is not enough to know that you make your car speed.
Thus we may see that the problem of applying causal models and intentions of
control to people is the problem of treating people as objects of events, objects of
external causes, rather than subjects of events. Having refined the issue to this
basic distinction, I may now proceed to assess its implications and significance
for planning. The hypothesis to be tested is that the issue of applying causal models
and controlled systems to human events, to people, has significant repercussions
for planning. Stated otherwise, treating people as objects rather than subjects can
be demonstrated to have undesireable consequences significant to planning goals.
To an individual perceiving himself to be a subject, control over his life
circumstances is viewed as being internal to himself. To an individual perceiving
himself as the object of event or of others, control over his life circumstances, his
life's events, is viewed as being external to himself. This dichotomy is the basis
of the construct in psychology known as "locus of control". In recent years, much
empirical research has been focused on the significance of this construct. Most
of the findings fall into two groups; obedience to authority and lack of motivation due
different evolution of science as occured in China is described in Needham, 1956.
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to a sense of helplessness. The origins of this research are as diverse as they
are fascinating. A brief review of some of this research is presented in the next
chapter as a test of my hypothesis.
In the following chapter works from the field of philosophy will be drawn on
to connect my hypothesized issue to the issues of experience, alienation, vitality,
growth, and emancipation. In the final chapter, the implications of this issue in
planning will be discussed.
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CHAPTER THREE: LOCUS OF CONTROL
Events in Nazi Germany during the Second World War produced many
disturbing questions for the world. How could a civilized nation perpetrate such
bestial and barbaric deeds, deeds requiring the complicity and awareness of many
individuals? When the generals, officers, doctors, lawyers, judges, and other
responsible officials were brought to trial at Nilrnberg, they were not the evil,
corrupt individuals the world had expected to find. In fact, they were found to be
quite ordinary, banal people. How could such ordinary men be guilty of such
horrendous acts? And the Jews in the camps, why had they submitted to their
imprisonment, to their executions, with such little resistance? These questions
were raised anew by the obedience experiments of Stanley Milgram in the early
1960's. (Steiner and Fishbein, 1965)
Psychiatrists have long pondered over the predicament of patients who did
not change their behavior no matter what - who literally did not seem to "own"
their own experiences. Similarly, educators were concerned about children with
low tolerances to frustration, who gave up easily when confronted with difficult
tasks.
In the late 1950 1s, Curt Richter began conducting experiments on the swimming
endurance of rats. Under ideal conditions, he had observed rats capable of swimming
up to eighty-one consecutive hours. In his experiments, he had set up large glass
jars with turbulent water. Each rat was grasped firmly in a gloved hand while his
whiskers were trimmed and was thea placed in the jar. Richter found that the rat
would "swim around excitedly for a few seconds, dive to the bottom apparently in
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search of escape, and then, after swimming around for a short time belowe the
surface, would suddenly stop and die. Most fascinating were the autopsy results
which revealed that the animals had not drowned." (Lefcourt, 1976, p 9) Several
rats whose whiskers had not been trimmed died in a similar manner. After much
thought, observation, and further attempts to isolate the relevant factors, Richter
concluded:
"This sudden-death phenomenon may however be considered also
as a reaction at a much higher level of integration. The situation
of these rats is not one that can be resolved by either fight or
flight - it is rather one of hopelessness: being restrained in the
hand or in the swimming jar with no chance of escape is a situation
against which the rat has no defense. Actually, such a reaction of
apparent hopelessness is shown by wild rats very soon after being
grasped in the hand and being prevented from moving. They seem
literally to give up. " (Richter, quoted in Lefcourt, 1976, p. 9)
Herbert Lefcourt wrote of an interesting case he wItnessed at a psychiatric
hospital:
"A female patient, who had remained in a mute state for
nearly ten years, was shifted along with her floor mates to a dif-
ferent floor of her building while her unit was being redecorated.
The psychiatric unit where the patient in question had been living
was known among the patients as the 'chronic hopeless? floor. In
contrast, the first floor to which the patient was moved was most
commonly occupied by patients who held privileges, including the
freedom to come and go on the hospital grounds and the surrounding
streets. In short, the first floor was an exit ward from which
patients could anticipate discharge fairly rapidly.
"Patients temporarily moved from the third floor were given
medical examinations prior to the move, and the patient in question
was judged to be in excellent medical health though still mute and
withdrawn. Shortly after moving to the first floor, the patient sur-
prised the ward staff by becoming socially responsive and, within
a two week period, she ceased being mute and was actually becoming
gregarious. As fate would have it, the redecoration of the third
floor unit was soon completed, and all previous residents were
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returned to it. Within a week after she had returned to the
'hopeless' unit, the patient, like the legendary Snow White
who had been aroused from a living torpor,. collapsed and
died. The subsequent autopsy revealed no pathology of not,
and it was whimsically suggested at the time that the patient
died of despair. " (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 10)
Starting in the late 1950's, researchers became interested in the correlation
between a belief in luck and academic achievement in school children. Among the
tools they used were forced-choice questionnaires, such as the Rotter Internal-
External Locus of Control Schedule, with questions like:
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has
little or nothing to do with it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right
place at the right time.
18. a. Most people can't realize the extent to which their lives
are controlled by accidental happenings.
b. There really is no such thing as "luck. " (Rotter, 1966)
A strong positive correlation was found between students who tended to answer 11. a
and 18.b and achievement in school. Those students who felt more strongly that
they had control over events in their lives were more persistent and successful
learners than those students who felt that events in their lives were more the
result of chance or some other external cause. It is in these studies that the term
'locus of control' came to be used.
"The idea of control and helplessness can be very clearly
defined in terms of conditioning. Operant conditioning is taking
place when the individual "operates" on his environment and
controls reinforcement. The rat in the Skinner box pressing a
bar for a food pellet is a well known example of operant condition-
ing. The rat has learned to act in a certain way to affect his
environment. He is in control of the arrival of the pellet or of
his reinforcements. He has learned that his actions effect certain
outcomes.
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"If the pellets arrive when the bar wasn't pressed, or
rather whether or not it was pressed, it would soon learn that
bar pressing was irrelevant to the arrival of the food pellets.
It may try pressing the bar a few times, just in case it worked
again, but eventually extinction would occur. Another term for
this is giving up. This type of situation can easily be imagined
in terms of human behavior. You give up when you realize that
your actions will not change the outcome of an event. You feel
helpless in that situation. Helplessness has been defined in the
following manner: 'A person is helpless with respect to some
outcome when the outcome occurs independently of all his vol-
untary responses."' (Seligman, 1975, p. 17)
"The situations of classical and operant conditioning are
obviously extreme and simple models that aren't typical of all
situations humans find themselves in. People are constantly in
a variety of complex environments that are hardly as clear as
the two above and yet we do formulate some picture of our help-
lessness or control. The degree to which an individual feels one
way or the other is known as his locus of control. The locus of
control construct is a 'cale with the sense of control at one
extreme and helplessness at the other. In the locus of control
model these extremes would be called internality and externality
respectively. The individualwho tends toward the internal end
of the scale feels that he does have an effect on outcomes of
events. He would attribute reinforcements (I don't mean positive
or negative in particular) to internal causes. The individual
tending toward the external extreme would be more likely to feel
that events were externally controlled and that outcomes should
be attributed to causes external to himself." (De Temple, 1975, pp. 1-3)
"The source of interest in this construct did not begin
simply with theoretical concerns but with problems encountered
in psychotherapy. . . . 'Clinical analysis of patients suggested
that while some patients appear to gain from new experiences or
to change their behavior as a result of new experiences, others
seem to discount new experiences by attributing them to chance
or to others and not to their own behavior or characteristics.'
(Rotter, 1966) . . . No matter the experiences one has, if they
are not perceived as the results of one's own actions, they are
not effective for altering the ways in which one sees things and
consequently functions. " (Lefcourt, 1976, pp. 29-30)
Richard de Charms, working with black pupils from inner-city schools,
described the construct slightly differently.
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"When a person initiates intentional behavior, he exper-
iences himself as having originated the intention and the behavior.
He is the locus of causality of the behavior and he is said to be
intrinsically motivated. Since he himself is the originator, we
refer to the person as the origin.
"When something external to the person impels him to
behavior, he experiences himself as the instrument of the outside
source, and the outside source is the locus of causality. He is
said to be extrinsically motivated. Since the person is impelled
from without we refer to him as a pawn. We sometimes talk of
people as primarily pushed around by outside forces. Conversely,
we refer to people as primarily origins implying that they charact-
eristically see themselves as originating their own behavior."
(de Charms, 1972, pp. 96-97)
While locus of control focuses on contingencies between actions and out-
comes, de Charms' origin-pawn dimension deals with perception of one's self as
a subject or object of actions.
de Charms established training programs specifically aimed at encouraging
origin behaviors in the schools. He found that he was able to arrest the increasing
discrepancy between these inner-city school children and the national norms for
scholastic tests by such personal causation training.
Another group of studies, conducted by David Glass, Jerome Singer and
others, concerned themselves with the issues of anxiety and frustration. In one
of the studies, subjects were asked to perform a series of simple tasks and also
a set of more complex puzzles and proof-reading tasks. While performing these
tasks, different groups of subjects were exposed to (a) a loud noise for a duration
of 9 seconds repeating every one minute, (b) a loud noise of random duration at
random intervals, and (c) and (d) a softer noise with the same timings as (a) and
(b). While intensity of the noise had some effect on subject performance, a far
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greater difference was observed in comparing the effects of predictability. "If
noise, or any aversive stimulus for that matter, were unanticipated, the shock
value of the stimulus would no doubt be augmented. Who has not found himself
startled by soft but unexplainable sounds occurring in the night " (Lefcourt,
1976, p. 4)
After the above sessions, the puzzles and proof-reading tests were
conducted without the interference of the noise. The subjects who had previously
been exposed to the predictable noise differed little from the control group which
had not previously been exposed to noise. The groups which had previously been
exposed to the random noise performed significantly worse than the other groups.
In a second study conducted by the same researchers, all of the subjects
were exposed to the loud random noise. This time half of the subjects were
given a button that would enable them to terminate the noise, should they so
desire, but were encouraged not to.
"Subjects with access to the off switch tried almost five
times the number of insoluble puzzles and made significantly
fewer omissions in proofreading than did their counterparts who
were given no such option for controlling the aversive stimula-
tion. These differences were obtained despite the fact that none
of the subjects who had potential control actually used it. The
mere knowledge that one can exert control, then, serves to
mitigate the debillitating effects of aversive stimuli. " (Lefcourt, 1976,
p.5)
These experiments have obvious implications for city living. In fact, all
of the subjects in the above-mentioned Singer and Glass studies were from New
York City. To better understand the implications of these findings we should look
more closely at perception and awareness.
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"If we know a sound, such as the starting of a furnace motor, we
know from where it originates and what consequences may be
expected from that sound. The sequence is predictable; nothing
untoward is anticipated. The sound will not change in pitch or
intensity. If unusual changes do occur, we would become suspi-
cious of the working of that furnace and summon a repairman.
In short, predictability is a major facet of knowing something.
The consistency and reliability of noise in the investigation -
described above instructs the subject that subsequent changes in
volume and timing of the noise are unlikely; there need be little
apprehension of a sudden increased intensity. As regularity is
perceived, the subject can also ready himself, slowing down in
his work efforts when he anticipates the onset of noise. He can,
therefore, avoid interruptions by not letting himself be caught
unawares and be distracted in the midst of an activity. " (Lefcourt,
1976, p. 5)
It is not so much the noise itself that is disturbing as its effect on us.
Knowing that a noise exists, i. e. reading about it, does not bother me nearly as
much as the direct experience of it. When I can correctly anticipate the noise
(or other potentially disturbing event), I may prepare myself. I, therefore, have
the opportunity to have some control over its effect on me. Why the noise could
affect me in the first place has to do with the nature of perception and awareness.
The extent to which a stimulus becomes the object of awareness is related to the
potential significance it has for our existence. "To an animal an affection
[percept] of the eye or ear is not an idle piece of information about someting
indifferently going on in the world. It is an inducement to act in a needed way.
(Dewey, 1948, p. 87) A sudden noise demands significant attention until it can be
determined that it does not indicate anything threatening. You may recall exper-
iencing the sudden "rush of adrenalin" when shocked by, say, someone stepping
out from behind a corner you were just about to reach. In situations demanding
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continued vigilance because of apprehensions of sudden unpredictable situations,
we naturally respond by maintaining a heightened state of readiness. Business-
men in high pressure situations and others who sense themselves to be in constant
danger are found to have high blood pressure caused by secretions from the adrenal
gland. This continued tenseness takes its toll on the ability to devote undivided
attention to other aspects of human functioning.
Taking things to an extreme, Staub, Tursky, and Schwartz (1971) found
that subjects who were allowed to administer electric shocks to themselves and
select the level of intensity of the shocks reported less discomfort at higher levels
of shock and endured stronger shocks than did paired subjects to whom shocks
were administered passively. This may seem a bit extreme, but when thinking
about the issues of control, foreknowledge, and understanding, we may begin to
gain new insights into such things as willingness of workers to exert themselves
and the tolerance of citizens for higher taxes and increased regulations. The
combinations of control and predictability become a powerful tool for understanding
society. 0. H. Mowrer, who conducted similar experiments with rats twenty
years before Staub, Tursky and Schwartz, wrote, "Perhaps we have isolated here,
in prototype, one of the central reasons why human beings so universally prize
freedom and why threats to freedom, under a totalitarian regime, are anxiety-
producing. " (Mowrer quoted in Lefcourt, 1976, p. 8) We may also better under-
stand the importance of harmony, order, and stability to the "weary travelers" of
our times. One's life can become unpleasantly frenetic if too many things are
demanding of one's attention.
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But what about obedience and the Milgram experiments? In the mid-sixties
Stanley Milgram conducted experiments in which subjects were instructed to
administer shocks to an accomplice of Milgram. Many of the subjects continued to
follow the instructions even when it appeared that the accomplice (an actor) was
suffering serious physical pain and injury from the shocks. As Milgram later
wrote, "A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective
of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they
perceive that the command comes from legitimate authority. (Steiner and Fish-
bein, 1965, pp. 261-262)
However, not all of the subjects had remained submissive to the experi-
menter. Later researchers, conducting similar, though not quite as dramatic,
research, labeled their subjects as externals or internals on the basis of attitude
tests. As Lefcourt described his findings after a series of experiments, "internals
were unresponsive to the experimenter's instructions, suggestions, and manipula-
tions, whereas externals readily capitulated, behaving, almost to a man, in accord
with task directions. ? (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 46) Lefcourt concluded that an internal
locus of control can operate as a "bulwark against'unquestioning submission to
authority". Other experiments have supported and elaborated this contention.
Experiments on the influence that arguments have in shifting people's views
found that externals were more likely to shift their views when influential argu-
ments were attributed to a prestigious government official than when the same
arguments were attributed to a college sophomore. Internals were not significantly
affected by who the arguments were attributed to, and were more likely to be
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influenced by the quality cf the arguments themselves. A study by James, Woodruff,
and Werner (1965) on the decision to quit smoking, found that in this case, not only
were internals less affected by authority and more discriminating in which influence
they will accept, but having accepted the information, they were more likely to
have changed their behavior in response to it.
Still other experiments, particularly by Pearl Gore (1962), investigating
under what circumstances internals would and would not cooperate, found that when
internally oreinted subjects felt that the experimenter was using coersion and
subtle manipulation, in other words, treating them as objects, pawns, they became
resistive, almost playfully negativistic. On the other hand, when the experimenter
shared his hypothesis with the subjects, inviting them to join him in objectively
studying their behavior in the experiment, thus showing respect for them as
persons, in other words, treating them as subjects, allowing active participation,
self-direction, the subjects became more responsive to the experimenter. I
suspect that applied in work situations, not only would internally motivated workers
be more responsive, but they would show added, self-directed initiative, in com-
parison with externally motivated coworkers. The.,well-known problems of GM's
Lordstown plant clearly show the behavior of internally motivated workers in a
manipulated, externally directed environment.
The implications of all of these findings are vast. Clearly internal
motivation is essential for performing the proper role of a citizen in a democratic
society. However, the promotion of external motivation, in essence, the breaking
of an individual's will, is essential for, and makes possible, the smooth functioning
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of a strongly centralized social structure, whether in labor management or
totalitarian states. There are still other findings coming from this particular
line of research.
Milgram was to some extent inspired by the murder of Kitty Genovese in
a densely populated section of New York City. Although her screams and cries
for help were heard for a long period of time by many people, no one sought to
help her or even called the police. A study by Midlarski (1971) found that internals
were more likely to help another individual than were externals, even when they
were penalized for doing so. A later study further concluded that internals are
more tolerant of discomfort in doing what they consider to be correct than extern-
als. We can imagine, with the issue of apathy, that externals would be more
likely to say, "That's not my business, not my responsibility".
The moral aspects of the above findings are quite clear. "If our hypothesis
is correct, when a person believes that he is the responsible agent or source of
his own life's fortunes, he will resist influence attempts which aim to bypass his
own sense of moral justice and will only respond to those appeals that address
themselves to his own beliefs and values." (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 50) We may now
better understand Lefcourt when, in reference to Hannah Arendt's book Adolph
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, she stated, "the most
horrendous acts derive more from obedience or compliance to social order than
from sadistic impulse." (1976, p. 36)
"The Fthrer's order for the Final Solution was followed by a
huge shower of regulations and directives, all drafted by expert
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lawyers and legal advisors, not by mere administrators; this
order, in contrast to ordinary orders, was treated as a law.."
(Arendt, 1963, p. 133)
Again in Lefcourt's words, "the horrors perpetuated by the Nazi officials
were legitimate, conforming to acceptable standards, and men like Eichmann felt
that it was not for them to question, since what they were asked to do was legitimate."
(1976, p. 37) Lefcourt's words have a startling similarily to current discussions
in planning theory. It is proposed by some that in the absence of certainty and the
flux of moral standards, that planners might seek justification in processes of
policy making which conform to acceptable standards. - Thus, in looking back, we
may see errors made but we will not condemn the people responsible. for the decisions
if they are seen to have followed acceptable procedures. This does not support an
abandonment of standards. Rather, in every situation where those "standards"
are applied, the standards themselves must be subject to scrutiny in the broadest
context. The planner, regardless of how widely practiced the procedures he uses
may be, must still accept personal moral responsibility for his own actions and
their consequences.
From their own teleological point of view, there are many good reasons
that planners should want to encourage a perspective of internal locus of control
in individuals and should design social institutions and environments which support
such an attitude. Ateleologically, self-motivated interactions with the environment
are, for Dewey and others, the "true 'stuff' of experience". Richter's rats and the
case of the patient in the hopeless ward might even support the contention that a
sense of control is the focus of life itself. In fact, as Jeanne DeTemple described
it:
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"There would seem to be a basic need or drive to
control one's environment, to have some effect on it. Exper-
iments with rats and pigeons have shown that when they are
given the choice of 'free food' or food which comes as a result
of their actions (bar pressing or pecking) they choose food
which they obtained through active control. (Carder et al.,
1970) The same need and preference for control has been
seen in infants. (Watson, 1971) Infants smile at mobiles
whose movement is contingent on their actions, but not at
mobiles that are unaffected by them. Both of these experi-
ments point to the theory that what is sought is not simply the
quality of the experience (obtaining food or seeing the mobile
move) but the sense the individual has that it was his own
actions that controlled the experience. This idea is certainly
linked to Piaget's stage of efficacy and causality. If you
believe in the need for an individual as he develops to exper-
ience his own effect on his world, a plausible explanation is
offered for the disasterous development of some institutionalized
children deprived of stimulation (see Provence & Lipton, 1962).
Children deprived of stimulation are necessarily deprived of the
opportunity to control it. The infants raised in dull environments
which were unresponsive to their efforts (crying, moving), soon
learn that their actions were irrelevant to the changes in their
lives (feeding or the arrival of the caretaker). They learn that
they are helpless rather than learning what they control. Extreme
helplessness has been seen to often lead to depression and emo-
tional problems. (Seligman, 1975)" (DeTemple, 1975, pp. 11-12)
Although I have not read any research done in the area,* there is specula-
tion that deprivation of opportunities to exercise individual control may lead to
antiinstitutional and often violent responses. Such responses may be viewed as
assertions of individuality, subjectness, not unlike the "playful negativity" of
internal subjects in the manipulation experiments. This would be the same kind
of behavior as the efforts to preserve a subjective identity in R. D. Laing's The
Divided Self. Much behavior termed anti-social is actually anti-institutional.
*There is apparently a recent study by Jessop, Graves, Hansen and Jesser on
access to opportunity in a town in the Southwest which correlates deviant behavior
with lack of access to desired outcomes.
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As a child, I visited the family of a school principal in Winnipeg, Canada,
and was told this story which has stayed in my memory. The principal's school
had a serious vandalism problem. Students had been throwing rocks through the
windows after dark. As a response to this, the school had installed several
bright lamps along the top of the high gymnasium wall to illuminate the school
yard. Those students who had been breaking the windows apparently turned their
attention to the newly installed lamps. The lamps were soon broken, but while
they had been the targets, significantly fewer windows had been broken. Some-
body in the school department came up with a bright idea. The lamp lenses were
replaced with stronger plastic lenses, but also, special sensors were installed.
When a lamp was struck, jarring the sensor, the lamp would automatically be
switched off. Ten minutes later the lamp would turn itself back on. Students did
indeed continue to attack the lamps in preference to the windows. However, they
were apparently satisfied with causing the lamps to turn off, and the school
maintenance budget was significantly reduced. I might interpret this as the
students in question feeling a need to demonstrate that the institution of the school
could be affected by their power even if in only a small and symbolic way. The
lamps became an obvious target of greater resentment because they were a
symbol of the school's efforts to prevent them from demonstrating that control.
Is it any wonder that street fixtures specially designed to be user-proof are prime
targets of vandals?
Another interesting case is that of a park in Somerville, Massachusetts,
which had significantly less vandalism than other parks in the area. Upon
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investigation it was found that the workmen who constructed the park had been
particularly friendly with the local kids allowing them to help in minor aspects of
construction. When they finished, they told the kids that they would be responsible
for the park from then on.. Having an authorized sense of responsibility and
having already exercised constructive control in aiding in the creation of the park,
vandalism lost much of its value as a means of demonstrating personal control of
that environment.
There is also support for my thesis in the concept of "Ressentiment", a
term coined by Nietzsche and used extensively by Edgar Friedenberg. Frieden-
berg describes it as "a free floating disposition to visit upon others the bitterness
that accumulates from one's own subordination and existential guilt at allowing
oneself to be used by other people for their own purposes, while one's own life
rusts away unnoticed. " (Friedenberg, 1975, p. xi)
All of these ideas pose a strong comdemnation of the kind of world B. F.
Skinner proposes in Beyond Freedom and Dignity. "It is paradoxical. . . that the
very surrender of the belief in free will advocated by Skinner as a step in the
direction of a less violent world can be viewed as a source of increased violence,
especially that of a prosocial kind. " (Lefcourt, 1976, p. 3)
John Masters (1970) reported a very interesting case of "adolescent
rebellion" which was reduced by therapy involving the "reconstruction of causality".
The young adolescent had been arrested for trying to steal a neighbor's car. (He
was inebriated at the time.) He was placed in a detention home the same evening
where he became agitated and destroyed the furnishings inhis cell. Clinical
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interviews revealed that he had been mildly depressed for about a year and had
beea experiencing a growing antagonism toward his family (reaching the point
where some physical violence had occurred). The youth described himself as "put
down"?, a pawn of his parents wishes.
"The client's initial perception of the relationship between
himself and his parents was one in which the parents were
the almighty controllers. He interpreted commands (which
may actually have been requests) to mow the lawn or wash
the car as infringements on his personal freedom. As
these examples were broughtout during therapy, it was pointed
out that they could be used to his advantage. It was argued
that parents learn to reward what they label "good son behav-
ior". This category of behavior includes a large number of
distinctly menial chores which by many adolescents are
considered degrading. It was then argued that they are
degrading if one falls into patterns of performing them blindly
or playing the game without being aware of the rules. How-
ever, such behaviors could also be performed intentionally and
"contingently" as a method for controlling parental behavior.
"A series of behaviors were planned in order to demon-
strate this hypothesis. On one day it was decided that GB was
to mow the lawn without being asked and then to report in
detail the effect of his maneuver on his family. The initial
report was that his father had difficulty in responding, that he
thanked GB, and subsequently he seemed less likely to enter
into verbal arguments. It was interpreted to GB that he had
become "master" of this game and had turned some tables.
. . . The father now felt obligated, and GB had very effectively
controlled the father's arguing behavior as, well by removing
a primary inciting stimulus from the fatherls repertoire. He
also had prevented his father from commanding (requesting)
him to mow the lawn by his early performance of the task, thus
removing an oppressive stimulus from his environment.
"Gradually the above procedure was applied to various
good son behaviors such as washing the car or helping out in
the family business. The results were consistantly positive.
Most notable were a reduction in friction between GB and his
father and early restoration of the use of the family car. . . .
Tangential to the planning of manipulative good son behaviors
were discussions concerning behaviors likely to produce
friction. . . . It was stressed that the father was the foil in
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this game, since his anger was automatic and unwitting. GB,
however, would be the master since he could predict his
father's behavior and thus control it by failing to provide the
necessary stimuli (coming home late). . . . The point of the
therapeutic arguments was always to describe the emission
of good son behavior as an effective method for the control
of parental behavior. " (Masters quoted in Lefcourt, 1976, p. 122)
Other aspects of therapy involved reinterpreting events which remained
unchanged, contributing to improved relations with the family and improved morale.
Eight months after therapy the youth was found in good spirits and doing well in
school.
What is interesting about this case is the reversal of the master-slave
relationship, at least in the mind of GB. This peculiar turning of the tables, the
role ambiguity, is an important coping mechanism for the victims of slave-master
relationships. By "playing up" to their dominators, the oppressed are in fact
manipulating those very people who assume themselves to be in control. In so
doing they retain a degree of self-dignity in an otherwise degrading situation.
Admittedly, an attitude of internal control of life events is not always in an
individual's best interest. Viewing oneself as an object of traumatic or frightening
events can be an important defense against a crushed sense of self or sense of
endemic impotence. One can understand the traumatic impact of the defense law-
yer's questioning a rape victim's appearance and behavior. In fact, as reported
by a rape counsellor known to this writer, the rape victims who seem the least
affected by the event report having viewed their bodies as objects of their own
cognizance, disconnecting it from their sense of self, isolating their egos com-
pletely from involvement and thus avoiding the dehumanizing sense of a violation
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of the innermost self, that which is the most personal being used by another. In a
milder form, we have the sheepish behavior of the insecure trying to appear as a
nobody in situations of social visibility or potential embarrassment rather than
having their subjective identities called into question or held up for ridicule.
Among the poor and down-trodden, an unrealistic sense of power and con-
trol would seem delusional and would result in some personal anguish. Imagining
personal potential control in a situation where such is not the case would lead to
unnecessary disillusionment and feeling of personal failure and impotence.
The relationship between locus' of control and an understanding of the poor
merits further discussion. Many of the poor and, in particular, welfare recipients
are often accused of lacking a sense of the future, of spending what little money
they get on immediate gratifications. An external locus of control has been
directly related with such a lack of concern with the future. When one feels little
or no control over one's own destiny, what is one left with but a sense of the
immediate. One's span of awareness of and concern for the future, about which
there is little one can do, diminishes. As Lefcourt describes it:
"The image of an individual at the brink of suicide,
being trapped within the immediate moment, for whom the
future has ceased to exist as a meaningful and positive force,
and who experiences himself as helpless to effect his fate
toward positive ends spells out for us the potential mutual
relevance of the perceptions of time and personal control, as
have few of the previous studies. " (1976, p. 77)
If the poor feel that helpless, why do they persist in their drudging
existences? When I think of the poor in this country and the American dream I
cannot help but think of those rats swimming in Richter's jars. Richter had found
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that if the rat were rescued from the jar just once, it would come to believe that
if it only persevered all was not hopeless, torture was not infinite. The rat would
then persist in swimming for lengthy periods of time, presumably hoping for
Richter's hand to return and rescue it once more. It has often been suggested
that such is the significance of gambling among the poor. Perhaps from their
perspective it is the best investment in the future they could make, the only hope.
These points have many important implications for welfare systems and
retirement. Retirement has been viewed as the utilitarian ideal of comfort,
relaxation, and enjoyment of pleasures. For many, this lack of meaningful
endeavor, this shift to a dependent situation, being cared for by the government
or a pension plan, worse, by a nursing home, symbolizes a lack of vitality. My
grandfather, who had struggled all his life to stay out of poverty, committed
suicide after retirement.
Welfare has become so blatantly manipulative, so inflexible and unconcerned
with the problems of individuals, little needs to be said. How can anyone struggling
to maintain an existance under the programs and administrations of welfare view
themselves as anything but helpless victims? Welfare regulations reflecting our
feelings of how recipients should behave do not function as a filter to select worthy
recipients but, to people dependent on the system, control every facet of their lives.
The issue of crime among the poor may also be understood in terms of locus
of control. The effectiveness of punishment as a deterant to crime rests on the
potential criminal viewing his fate as contingent on his own actions. We have all
heard of young boys, already professional criminals, who view prison sentences as
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unfortunate circumstances that just have to be endured. The simple point of the
matter is that one who does not have experience and belief in his own control over
his life circumstances, his environment, cannot be expected to feel responsibility
for his own actions in the way our laws (moral and political) are expected to have
an effect. Our prisons, for example, have one origin in an old Quaker concept of
a man with an inner sense of responsibility being brought back into contact with it
by being left alone in a room with a Bible in it. I am reminded of a suburban town
I lived in where adolescent youths were seldom treated with respect or trusted with
responsibility. They were always being harrassed when more than two of them
congregated together. The problem of youth crime was a vicious circle.
But it is not only street crimes that can be viewed through the locus of
control construct. White collar crimes and, more directly, the kind of quasi-moral
behavior Solzhenitsyn referred to in his 1978 Harvard commencement address when
he complained that the letter of the law had replaced personal moral conviction,
can just as easily be related to the locus of control concepts. The tendency to
legislate conformity (in the guise of compliance to standards) is exactly counter to
what these arguments would recommend. It is not surprising that when we respond
to issues with legislation, legal standards - in effect telling people what is right
and wrong, taking responsibility away from their own judgments - that the mini-
mums become the maximums.
The poor success rates of our reform programs may also be related to
locus of control. By placing convicted criminals in total institutions where they are
overtly made victims of the system, they have no opportunity to acquire a sense of
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responsibility or learn the basics of good citizen behavior. Those who come in
with some sense of responsibility may actually have that sense extinguished.
After having applied the concept of locus of control so extensively, I should
like to reassert that it is only a construct, a theory like any other, useful as a
means for describing and interpreting events, but not an objective fact in the sense
of a thing in itself. It is used to describe an attitude, a predisposition to view
events in a certain way. It is not a characteristic of people like red hair or blue
eyes. One would be hard pressed to find somebody who views all events as being
subject to his own will or no events over which he might exert the slightest influ-
ence. What tends .to be the case is that people view certain events or kinds of
events as beyond their control while other events or kinds of events are viewed as
potentially within their control.
While I used locus of control to explain vandalism, it would be naive to
expect it to explain all vandalism. Nor should we expect that by changing attitudes
about locus of control in all vandals we would eliminate all vandalous acts. Locus
of control might only play a small part in the actual decision to gamble by an
individual.
But locus of control is an analytical tool which may be used,' along with
others, by planners and psychologists to understand the situations they confront
and devise strategies for improvement. The locus of control research is used here
to provide empirical evidence and meaning for the Galilean-Aristotelean dichotomy.
The two issues correspond in that they both use the same subject-object construct.
They differ in that the former views events from a point internal to an actor in the
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events described while the latter views the events from a point external to that
actor.
My hypothesis was that this issue is of significance to planning. I assume
that planners would desire that people make moral judgments, accept responsibility
for their acts, and actively seek to better their own lives. Therefore, -I will assert
that the weight of the evidence here presented would indicate that as a social policy
it is undesirable to treat people as objects. Furthermore, in light of the evidence
of improvement in locus of control attitude which was shown to accompany approp-
riate social situations and therapies, it is a desirable social policy to encourage
independent, responsible actions by individuals by designing systems which accept
people as subjects, allow them greater opportunity to exercise their own subjectness.
The planning implications of these findings will be presented in the final
chapter. In the next chapter other implications of the subject-object construct will
be drawn from major works in philosophy and social theory. The intention will be
to show how the distinction is related to other issues relevant to planning.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL THEORY
In this chapter I shall attempt to connect the subject-object distinction, as
an issue in description and theory, and several major social issues drawn from
the field of philosophy. My intention is to explore some of the broader social
implications of the hypothesized issue. I have chosen to discuss John Dewey's
notion of experience, which is central to his social and educational theories, Karl
Marx's early writing on alienation, and the basis of the existentialist point of view.
All of these theories are found to support the contention of my hypothesis that
there is an important distinction between treating people as subjects and treating
them as objects, people acting as subjects and people acting as objects. The final
section of this chapter deals with theories pertaining to the emancipation of individ-
uals from determination in their lives. Aspects of the issues raised in this chapter
appear in problems confronted by planners. Hopefully, this chapter will serve, on
the one hand, to deepen our understanding of the hypothesized issue and, on the
other hand, to help us recognize more readily where the issue may be of relevance.
Experiencing oneself as the subject of events has an important role in the
thinking of John Dewey. It is the connection between doing and undergoing the
consequences which formed what he calls experience. In contrast to a mechanistic
phychology which views mental life as originating in an awareness of passively
received sensations, "experience becomes an affair primarily of doing". (Dewey,
1948, p. 86) What is important to life is actually being a subject, carrying out
act;ions affecting the environment which stem from one's own intentions. "Even a
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clam acts upon the environment and modifies it to some extent."? (p. 86) For
philosophy, "the interaction of organism and environment, resulting in some
adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the primary fact. " (p. 87)
This is essentially the same view as held by Lefcourt. In commenting on some
recent locus of control studies involving health and fatality rates in nursing homes,
he ventured that the normal condition of living creatures is to affect things.
Friedrich Nietzsche, in The Will To Power (section 649), states, "The influence
of 'external circumstances' is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous extent:
the essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-
creating force working from within which utilizes and exploits 'external circum-
stances. "' Allowing others to develop and exercise their own creative forces is a
part of accepting them as subjects.
Karl Marx is in agreement here. For Marx, man vitalizes himself through
the transformation of nature, reproducing himself in nature. But he is on-ly vital-
ized when he is the subject of his labor, when his activity is initiated by his own
intentions and the products are the objects of his own will. When his labor is the
object of another being, he experiences alienation.
"What constitutes the alienation of labour? First, that
the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his
nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfill himself in
his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather
than well being, does not develope freely his mental and physical
energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased. . . .
His work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labour." (Marx, 1963)
The worker works only to fulfill a physical need, the need for survival. But the work
he does is not his own, not initiated by himself, not producing goods for his own use,
not serving his own enjoyment.
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In line with the dualism mentioned earlier, Marx draws a distinction
between species-life and individual physical existence. Species-life is the aspect
of human life that makes it distinct from animal life. "In the type of life activity
resides the whole character of a species, its species-character; and free,
conscious activity is the species character of human beings. Life itself appears
only as a means of life.
"It is just in his work upon the objective world that man
really proves himself as a species-being. . . . The object of
labour is, therefore, the objectification of man's species-life;
for he no longer reproduces himself merely intellectually, as
in consciousness, but actively and in a real sense, and he sees
his own reflection in a world which he has constructed."
"Just as alienated labour transforms free and self-
directed activity into a means, so it transforms the species-life
of a man into a means of physical existence. " "Thus alienated
labour turns the species-life of man, and also nature as his
mental species-property, into an alien being and into a means
for his individual existence. It alienates from man his own body,
external nature, his mental life and his human life."
Marx clearly rejects the notion of behavior being determined by nature,
mechanistic. For animals behavior might be innate, necessitated, but for man it
is free, subject to his intellect. He also rejects any notion that labor might serve
some purpose other than the intentions of man. Tflerefore, there can be no justi-
fication for imposing restrictions on men's labor other than reasons put forward
by men.
"If my own activity does not belong to me but is an alien,
forced activity, to whom does it belong? To a being other than
myself. And who is this being? The gods? It is apparent in the
earliest stages of advanced production, e.g. temple building,
etc. in Egypt, India, Mexico, and in the service rendered to the
gods. But the gods alone were never the lords of labour. And
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no more was nature. What a contradiction it would be if the
more man subjugates nature by his labour, and the more the
marvels of the gods are rendered superfluous by the marvels
of industry, the more he should abstain from his joy in
producing and his enjoyment of the product for love of these
powers.?!
(We might include society along with the gods and nature.)
"The alien being to whom labour and the product of
labour belong, to whose service labour is devoted, and to
whose enjoyment the product of labour goes, can only be man
himself. If the product of labour does not belong to the worker,
but confronts him as an alien power, this can only be because
it belongs to a man other than the worker. If his activity is a
torment to him it must be a source of enjoyment and pleasure
to another. Not the gods, nor nature, but only man himself
can be the alien power over men.?"
If man "is related to his own activity as to unfree activity, then he is related to it
as activity in the service, and under the domination, coercion and yoke, of another
man. " Marx devotedmost of his attention to labor, on man's labor being dominated
by others. But man's environment could likewise be dominated by others, alienated
from him. It is only in his environment that his species-being can be affirmed. If
his environment is unresponsive, controlled by others, that opportunity does not
exist. Planning which denies the species-being of man, or simply ignores it, is a
source of alienation, just as "forced labor" is.
Alienation results when government officials impose their will on an unwill-
ing or unwitting populace. Can planning be justified as being for the good of the
people if it serves to alienate them from their environment, from their government?
What are the social consequences of the tendency toward increasing centralization
in business and in government, particularly in policymaking where planners form
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a growing professional elite? Have our concepts of freedom and liberty become
more limited and abstract? To what extent should alienation and the reduction of
personal freedom be criteria in policy analysis? These are serious questions with
broad implications for government action. Whether people experience themselves
as subjects or as objects of government action, whether government action con-
tributes to the growth of individual "species-life" or to alienation are realities
which planners play a major role in determining by their actions.
John Dewey, in his book Reconstruction in Philosophy, argues that the
purpose of all social institutions is to "set free and to develope the capacities of
human individuals".
"Government, business, art, religion, all social
institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to
set free and to develope the capacities of human individuals
without respect to race, sex, class or economic status.
And this is all one with saying that the test of their value is
the extent to which they educate every individual into the full
stature of his possibility. Democracy has many meanings,
but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that
the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial
arrangements shall be the contribution they make to all-
around growth of every member of society. " (Dewey, 1948, p. 186)
Dewey was very critical of the Utilitarians, and their effects on the thinking
of his day. He felt that society was too often viewed as a means of increasing
material wealth rather than individual growth. He bemoaned the attitude that life
goals were things to be attained and possessed rather than continuously reaffirmed.
"Not perfection as a final goal but the ever-enduring
process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim of living.
Honesty, industry, temperance, justice, like health, -wealth,
and learning are not goods to be possessed as they would be if
they expressed fixed ends to be attained. They are directions
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of change in the quality of experience. Growth itself is the
only moral 'end. "I (Dewey, 1948, p. 177)
This, too, is the basis of the existentialist point of view as espoused by
Sartre and others. The real, vital self is only a possibility "unless and until it
realizes and establishes itself in decisions; it comes into existence only in coming
to decisions. What kind of decisions? All kinds; but above all, the acknowledge-
ment that decisions are required of me, the awakening of my unlimited responsibility,
'Condemned to be free' in Sartre's phrase. " (Blackham, 1965, p. 6)
"I cannot take refuge in what 'is done, ' nor in what is
required, nor in thought-out principles: insecurity, care is
our lot. Thinking which brings this home is valid; thought
taught as 'results' gives out a security which can never be
ours. This insecurity, however, is the condition of spontane-
ity, vitality, passion, creativity, the condition of human life
and living; whereas all our securities are states of death."
(Blackham, 1965, p. 6)
Existentialism emphasizes experience of the self as a subject. Sartre wrote
at length on the tension between subject and object perceptions. In seeking to help
others, as in the field of psychiatry where Existentialism has been particularly
influential, it is stressed that the other must be met as a subject. The analyst,
"trained in a particular school, is liable to be 'blinded by science, ' to see only
what he has been schooled to recognize, whereas the existentialist refuses to see
in the 'other' an object of knowledge and is ready to 'encounter' and 'meet' a
person even in a patient. " (Blackham, 1965, p. 13) This advice is meaningful for
the planner as well. He must not see others merely as objects in his models of
reality, but encounter them as real persons, subjects in their own environments.
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If we are to accept John Dewey's argument that individual growth should be
the ultimate goal of all our programs, then we must have some understanding of
what growth is. Growth and learning is an active process of which the indiviidual
must be the subject. We don't grow kids; kids grow, mature, just as in the analogy,
given the right conditions, the acorn develops into an oak tree. (Horney, 1950) By
learning one acquires the tools with which to confront the world. Understanding
means being able to affect our relationships with the given events. If we can predict
events we can adjust our lives to reap the greatest advantage of events. If we can
affect events, we can alter situations to be of greatest advantage. With each new
thing we learn, we extend that portion of the world which we understand, with which
we can adjust our relationship, through which we can assert our vitality. The
more one believes that one can potentially control events around him, the more
inspired one is to want to understand, to be able to vitalize that potential. Those
things we are left in awe of (and ignorance or confusion about) are able to affect our
lives independent of our wills; the car that breaks down, the virus that infects, the
insurance that does not cover, the neurosis that is self-defeating. We are at the
mercy of that which we do not understand as we can do nothing about our relation-
ship to it, with the possible exception of isolating ourselves from these unknowns,
cutting off opportunities. This is true whether the phenomena be mechanical,
natural, political, administrative, emotional, or whatever, including the workings
of the government and the activities of planners.
People are victims when bodies of government meet in closed sessions;
when the legal code is incomprehensible; when planners make decisions about
neighborhoods which the residents do not understand or are even unaware of.
We cannot apply our magical algorithms to social planning, presenting the results
as truths without comprehensible explanations. We ourselves are victims of our
own theories when we apply them unreflectedly, without full understanding of
their significances.
We must not only seek to emancipate ourselves as planners from old
theories, but we must also free our fellow victims. As I stated in Chapter Two,
social scientists, on the model of physical science, seek to identify fixed laws
about human behavior, laws in which humans are the objects of causal relation-
ships. Planners use these laws to design instrumental strategies..
But such laws are not real laws. Human beings are the objects of laws
only to the extent that they allow themselves to be. We make decisions about how
we will respond whether we do so out of a belief in fate or a desire to change our
situation. We are "condemned to be free". If we accept (internalize) a value in
maximizing monetary wealth, then we will respond to monetary incentives, though
we may still choose not to. If we fear bodily harm, we will respond to physical
threat, but we may choose not to. To the extent that our responses are unreflected,
we are for all intents and purposes unfree. But when our decisions, our responses
are reflected, our choice is free.
The Romans used the threat of force to maintain control over their subjects.
But many of the early Christians denied the fear of death or injury as a control
over their actions. The Romans could lock them in prisons or feed them to the
lions, but they could not make them serve the caesar.
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Jtirgen Habermas, in his critique of social theory, Knowledge and Human
Interests, wrote:
"The systematic sciences of social action, that is
economics, sociology, and political science, have the goal,
as do the empirical-analytic sciences, of producing nomo-
logical knowledge. A critical social science, however, will
not remain satisfied with this. It is concerned with going
beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements
grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when
they express ideologically frozen relations of dependance
that can in principle be transformed. To the extent that this
is the case, the critique of ideology, as well, moreover, as
psychoanalysis, take into account that information about law-
like connections sets off a process of reflection in the
consciousness of those whom the laws are about. Thus the
level of unreflected consciousness, which is one of the initial
conditions of such laws, can be transformed. Of course to
this end a critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through
reflection alone render a law itself inoperative, but it can
render it inapplicable. " (p. 310)
Unreflected consciousness is the precondition of "laws" of human behavior. Any
attempt to make the "laws" valid and applicable would be an attempt to promote
unreflected (automaton) behavior. Our goal should be the opposite, to wrest
control (meaning) from these "laws" and put it in the consciousness of individual
actors. The appropriate use of knowledge gained from the social sciences is not to
control people but to free people, to minimize determination in their lives.
If we ask whether people should be determined or free, then a meaningful
question would be "Can people be determined?" The answer to this question at
this point must be "No."1 The appearance of success in attempts at determination
is limited. We have nothing approaching a comprehensive view enabling the success-
ful guidance of human existence, regardless of the purpose for which we might
desire to use such guidance. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the locus of control
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research, attempts at determination have very undesirable consequences.
According to John Dewey, guidance models specified in terms of what people do
are misstated. It is not what people do as much as that they do it themselves
which is important in human experience.
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING
To see what the implications of the previously mentioned theories are for
the situation confronted by planners, I have chosen a description of the situation
from John Friedmann's Retracking America. He characterized the basic problem
as the combination of an unresponsive guidance system and a non-participant society.
The unresponsiveness stems from an increasingly centralized power and decision-
making structure which makes decisions in locations far removed from their point
of impact, based on generalized and filtered information.
"The other aspect of a progressively unresponsive
guidance system is a population that is progressively less and
less the master of its destiny, whose lives are subject to
random impersonal forces that no longer seem to be intended
or controlled by anyone. Despite the official rhetoric to the
contrary, America is becoming a non-participant society. Its
people have little understanding of their own environment.
They are fed ready-made explanations by the media, but none
of these seems to account for what is happening. Being so
remote from control over events, the non-participant subject
finally ceases even to care. He does not read the annual
report of the business in which he works but concentrates
instead on the small world of his job. His view of politics is
cynical. He skims the news about his city, hurrying on to
the sports and entertainment pages, and he is mesmerized by
evening prime-time television. From time to time, some
spectacles, such as the landing on the mooA, are arranged
for his diversion.
"The non-participant society is stirred up by its
troubles, because they affect the lives of individuals within
it: the war swallows its children, automation eliminates its
jobs, the reeking air destroys its lungs, the poor make claims
upon its pocketbooks. But no one really understands how all
this comes about. The world seems alive with mysterious
and evil forces. Conspiracy is suspected everywhere."
(Friedmann, 1973, pp. 191-192)
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It is not surprising that people give up caring when their own wills are felt
to have little impact on their environment and circumstances, when the news serves
only to remind one of how helpless and victimized we are. Security takes on an
exaggerated value and the general level of anxiety becomes a national health issue.
Conspiracy is easily suspected when the changes in the environment are dictated
by people never met, whose decisionmaking is little heard about, let alone under-
stood, to which there is little chance of input, let alon participation.
"The system we have engendered is approaching the
breaking point. The combination of growing unresponsiveness
and non-participation is tearing the society apart. The guid-
ance system is becoming increasingly reactive, moved by the
unexpected turbulance of events, frantically putting out fires
without ever seriously approaching the structural sources of
conflagration that seems to be gaining on what is left of the
inherited order. These palliative measures are only partially
effective, and their costs to the society are rising vertigin-
ously. As a result, a small but growing segment of the popu-
lation is beginning to withdraw its allegiance from the society."
(Friedmann, 1973, p. 192)
The decision system discussed in Chapter One was shown to have a tendency
to address problems on a superficial level. What Friedmann is arguing is that
while attacking symptoms, the underlying problems may continue to get worse,
simply producing more symptoms. The societal gtiidance structure simply appears
ineffectual. It may be blind to the causes, especially when the causes include the
system itself. Through centralization, the decision making system becomes
removed from real, everyday problems, seeing instead, generalized issues des-
cribed by theoretical models. The segment of the population withdrawing its
allegiance referred to by Friedmann were the student protesters. Today there is
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a more general tendency caricatured by the statement, "Pm fed up! I won't take
any more!" from the movie "Network" and taking form in the Howard Jarvis "tax
rebellion".
"The basic structural problem of the American guidance
system is its rising level of ignorance. Reason has become
unhinged from action, leading knowledge to take refuge in the
cloistered irrelevancies of esoteric language, and actions to
lag farther and farther behind the events they seek desperately
to control. To re-establish the essential linkage, society needs
a heightened learning capacity. This will never be achieved by
creating some sort of superb rain that is plugged into a nationwide
monitoring system of social indicators and whose repository of
quantitative models spews out appropriate answers. The reali-
zation of this current dream, so dear to technocrats, would only
widen the existing breach between knowledge and action with truly
tragic consequences for the society." (Friedmann, 1973, pp. 192-193)
The super-brain ideal mentioned by Friedmann is the logical conclusion of
the attempts to deal with the shortcomings of our decision systems as described at
the end of Chapter One. The information presented in Chapters Three and Four
would recommend a different approach to dealing with the kinds of problems
described by Friedmann.
Let us look at a specific example of a planning action which may be char-
acterized as having been a failure, as having contributed to the kinds of problems
mentioned by Friedmann. The case may seem extreme, but only because of the
comprehensiveness of the impact it had on those whom it sought to help. The
decision-making processes were not untypical.
A few years ago, planners in Washington, D. C., noticed from their tables
that the per capita annual income of a particular Indian community in the Four
Corners region of Arizona was one of the lowest in the country. This fact was
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pointed out in a Congressional hearing as an example of extreme poverty. The
Bureau of Indian Affairs was instructed to do something about it. A planner from
the BIA went to the reservation and found a group of families living in mud huts
huddled close together, scraping an existence off the land. The BIA felt that it
would be in their best interest to provide them with jobs and use a newly available
federal grant to build them a modern community. Coincidentally there was known
to be coal on a nearby reservation which could be used to supply needed power for
the Southern California area. Mineral rights to the coal were leased to the
Peabody Mining Company, a planner laid out a modern rectilinear settlement, and
modern wood-frame ranch-style houses were constructed.
The matter was quite straightforward. The Indians were poor, as the
statistics showed. Jobs were created on the reservation within driving access.
They lived in substandard housing. New housing was constructed at government
expense. The Indian families were not carefully consulted, only told what would
be done for them. The determination of what was to be done with the lives of the
Indians was made on the basis of widely held and applied planning standards and
models concerning poverty, employment, and housing.
From the Indians' point of view the matter was very different. The reason
the statistics showed no income was that they were self-sufficient farmers,
gathers, and grazers. Although they had little opportunity to make money, being
able to raise only enough food for themselves, they didn't need much. Their mud
huts were traditional houses developed over centuries for their particular situation.
The thick walls moderated the extreme temperatures of night and day. The solid
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walls also helped keep out scorpions, mice, and other pests. Should one be
found, the hole through which it came could be easily located and patched. Their
stoves burned wood gathered from the area. Their houses were huddled in a
circle because they were a communal tribe, sharing in cooking and watching after
each other's children.
The new homes were not well suited to the area. They were hot in the day
and cold at night. The hollow walls made it nearly impossible to identify the means
of entrance of scorpions and mice. The arrangement of houses and the distance
between them made personal interaction inconvenient and watching other children
impossible. They had no personal interest in coal, the land was sacred to them,
not something to be exploited, but something they lived in harmony with. (For a
story of how the Peabody Mining Company dug up a whole mountain which had been
an integral part of the Hopi lore of their origin, see Black Mesa.)
However, the Indians had no choice but to work in the mines. The worst
part of the new community was that it made them dependent on money. The
stoves and heating ran on gas. That cost money. Wood fires would be too danger-
ous in the wooden houses. The houses, poorly constructed by outside laborers
contracted by the government, could not be repaired with locally found material.
That cost money. To get to work, they needed cars which cost money. While
working in the mines, they could not cultivate food, nor could wives who had to
spend more time watching children. Food had to be bought too. In Washington,
the statistics showed the per capita annual income had risen noticeably.
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What effect could all this have had on the Indians? Their lives were
radically affected by planners in a distant city whom they never met. They had
no say in planning the new community nor any part in constructing it. Their
sacred soil was sold against their will; the BIA had appointed a council of known
supporters to sign the lease. Control over their own destinies was reduced, both
in the particular event of change and in their new circumstances. The mining
interests now rule the area. A huge new power plant pollutes their air. Whose
lives were enriched by these actions?
Aside from the obvious flaws in detail resulting from an inadequate under-
standing of the situation, the initial attitude of the planners, that they would make
the Indians better off, made it inevitable that there would be a misfit between the
plan and the people it was supposed to benefit. Though a conclusion of conspiracy
seems obvious, the planners themselves may not have desired the actual outcomes.
They too may have been the victims of their models and their methods. They had
been "blinded by science", seeing only "an object of knowledge". How could
these problems have been avoided?
A planner concerned about the subject-object issue would not have used
theories and models to generate fixed, ready-to-apply solutions in this situation.
The Indians were not given a conscious role in the decisions for changing their
environment. In this type of usage, the theories reified the role of the Indians as
total objects of their environment. By ignoring the subjectness of the Indians,
applications of the theories on housing and employment served to deny its rele-
vance to the quality of their lives. Changes in the environment, alone, were seen
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as being capable of improving the Indians' freedom to act as subjects through the
creation of a situation which forced them to act in accordance with the assumptions
of the theories about the quality of living was overlooked.
What approach should planners take? How might their methods be modified
to avoid such problems? At the end of Chapter Three, I stated that, based on the
evidence presented, it was undesirable, where possible, to enact strategies which
encouraged independent, responsible actions by individuals through systems and
procedures which accepted people as subjects, allowing them greater opportunity
to exercise their own subjectness, in shaping their environments and acting within
them.
What does it mean to accpet people as subjects? Suppose I am a planner
within the government bureaucratic structure. I have prepared a plan which I
think is needed to deal with an important problem. However, within the organiza-
tional structure, there are many individuals whose cooperation is needed to
realize the implementation of the plan. If I view these people as objects - poten-
tial obstacles - then my implementation strategy involves ways to get through
them or around them. If it becomes apparent that they will not "fall into line",
then I could circumvent their authority by appealing to higher authorities; I could
coerce them by threatening to hold up their own projects; I could trick them by
misrepresenting the plan; I could preempt their options, force them into a position
where to choose otherwise would jeopardize their jobs; I could offer to pay them
off; in short, do whatever it takes to get the plan implemented. In simple terms,
I make a decision and I view other bureaucrats as objects to be manipulated in
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carrying out that decision. The role of the planner is one who makes decisions
to be carried out (not necessarily by himself, but he devises the strategy for
doing so) - an elitist planner with authority derived from his special position.
On the other hand, I could view these people as subjects - people who
make their own decisions about their own actions. In this case I have one choice,
logically to persuade them to agree with my plan and willingly assist in the imple-
mentation. In this situation, a planner who cannot convince others that his ideas
are good is not a good planner. By failing to consider how the plan, and my actions,
will affect others, including my fellow workers, I have failed fully to consider the
environment in which the plan must function and its full implications. The
bureaucrat who feels himself treated as an object may well become entrenched and
stubborn, if only to demonstrate that he can make his own decisions, that he is
more important than the office furniture. Even old, embittered bureaucrats are
individuals with feelings and ideals.
Further, in this situation, planning is interactive. Should another suggest
modifications to my original proposal, I will consider them and, if they are good,
I will adopt them. If I am presented with reasons -vhy the plan may face difficulties,
I will seek alternatives. In this stereotypical bureaucratic situation, the planner
must consider the reasons others might be reluctant to accept the plan, including
personal reasons. My immediate goal is that all parties agree on the plan, or
modified plan, such that others may carry out their own responsibilities willingly
and constructively in accordance with the plan. In this view, the planner is an
advisor and assistant, a resource person, one of the team, who helps generate
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good ideas. Decision making is something everyone does for himself. John
Friedmann described a related example.
The Department of Transportation had hired a major research corporation
to make proposals for decentralizing their services. The papers were prepared
by professors at several universities with little contact with the real situation and
proved of little relevance.
"In this as in so many other situations, planning was
carried out with no regard for the processes of goal clarifi-
cation and policy formation. The research corporation and
the professors conceived of their task exclusively in technical
terms. They had no stake in the results of their studies.
They failed to take their client on a learning trip.
"What might have been done? Assuming that the original
request for technical assistance was a serious one, an office
might have been established in Washington for as long as
necessary. Personal contacts might have been established with
the originators of the request in the department, flesh-and-blood
people with passions of their own. A review of the department's
activities might have been jointly undertaken to see which might
be decentralized and why. In problems such as these, the out-
side technical expert can be of greatest help by structuring the
questions in a useful way and supplying concepts to help clarify
the basic issues involved. The experts in this case might have
served a catalytic role in organizing such a study, mediating
among the different factions, proposing hypotheses, and sum-
marizing the current state of theoretical knowledge. In doing
all these things, they would have had to be-in daily contact with
the client staff. Personal relationships would gradually have
developed. And in the end, the solution would have appeared as
a discovery of the client himself.
"In mutual learning, the planner and client each learn
from the other - the planner from the client's personal
knowledge, the client from the planner's technical expertise.
In this process, the knowledge of both undergoes a major change.
A common image of the situation evolves through dialogue; a new
understanding of the possibilities for change is discovered. And
in accord with this new knowledge, the client will be predisposed
to act." (Friedmann, 1973, 11. 184-185)
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But these standards should not just apply to an office situation. What about
those we ultimately serve, the populace? They do not want to be treated as
numbers, to be manipulated according to the outcomes of planning models. In the
case of the Indians, the government should have asked the Indians what changes
they wanted. They could have provided experts to work with them in planning their
future and money and supplies to help them make their own improvements. This
would have made it unlikely that the planners would have become the unwitting
accomplices of the Peabody Mining Company.
Let me describe another hypothetical example. Suppose I work for a public
housing authority, perhaps as a housing project manager. Suppose I am confronting
the problem of broken windows. The incremental planner might see his job as
getting the windows fixed. Perhaps I might want to prevent more windows from
being broken. I could make the windows less breakable, using plexiglass or pro-
tective screening. I could also try to make it less likely that attempts will be made
to break them. In the latter case, I might employ a guard, an extreme solution,
light up the surrounding areas at night as a deterrent, or post warnings of stiff
punishments for persons caught breaking windows;*. This attitude involves mech-
anistic, closed models of the solutions. How can I, the decision maker, set up a
system which will result in fewer broken windows? What actions on my part will
cause others not to break these windows? How can I prevent them from doing so,
from being able to do so?
But here the issue obviously does involve other human actors. The windows
do not break by themselves. Someone, or some persons, is, or are, choosing to
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break them. Why? Nor are the windows in question only mine. If nobody lived
in the housing project, there would be no need to fix windows. They could be
boarded up. Why shouldn't the tenants share in solving their problems?
The problem is a difference between what is, broken windows, and what I
think should.be, unbroken windows. Since someone is actively choosing to create
broken windows, or at least to break windows, it would seem that he and I differ
in our ideas of what should be. Ideally I should meet this person, and others like
him, and negotiate. Perhaps he is trying to communicate something through his
actions. Perhaps he has a need (such as a place to play or, as in the Winnipeg
case, the opportunity to show that he can affect the system) which I could enable
to be satisfied in some other way. Knowing that someone cares about them, as
well as the windows, makes a difference to people. They are subjects, not objects.
I must be willing to accept them, to confront them as human beings.
The tenants ostensibly share my ideal concerning the windows. The
situation as it is represents a problem for them, too. In the common situation,
they are dependent on the superintendent for getting the windows fixed. They
themselves are helpless to rectify their problem. The situation can only be a
source of frustration for them. Why shouldn't tenants be allowed to fix their own
windows? Why not train them and provide the necessary tools? This solution would
be cheaper than most others. The source of tenant frustration would be reduced.
The tenants might even gain in confidence and a sense of self-sufficiency from
being able to help themselves. They might take greater pride in their property
when it is no longer seen as someone else's responsibility. The windows would
become a personal matter, not a symbol of an impersonal system.
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In this case we can see the operationalization of both the ideal of treating
people as subjects and the ideal of increasing the ability of people to exercise their
own control over situations. The procedure involved identifying the persons
involved in the problem and working with them to bring about solutions.
What about problems of a larger scale? Friedmann saw his learning
society solutions as taking place within a utopian society with a decentralized
structure of learning cells. Decentralization may be a consequence of a shifted
emphasis in problem solving just as centralization is a consequence of the
present emphasis. But a particular social structure is not a necessary precon-
dition of shifting the emphasis of planning from a mechanistic base to a humanistic
base.
Planners in New York City face a major problem in the South Bronx. Arson
has reached epidemic proportions. Good housing burns down every day. There is
a trend which starts with landlords losing money on their investments in the
housing market. They cease making repairs on their property. The tenants find
their living conditions deteriorating. Some tenants move out, and the vacant
apartments attract vagrants, thieves, and vandals. There are incidents of tenant
and building abuse. Other tenants move out or desire to move out and soon the
building becomes an object of arson. There are, of course, other factors contrib-
uting to the situation, and other details beyond my nutshell explanation.
The government finds itself helpless to solve the problem. It cannot
adequately police the neighborhoods. It cannot prevent fires from destroying the
buildings. It cannot afford to repair and maintain the buildings. Many have suggested
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that the South Bronx be cleared and a new community started from scratch.
Perhaps, like Boston's West End, high security high rises could be constructed
for the upper-middle class. Still, New York faces a housing shortage for the
lower income brackets.
Several community organizers have found another solution in sweat-
equity rehabilitation. With little financial support from the city, they arrange to
obtain control of property not yet burned and with a sound structure. They
organize existing tenants and others interested in occupying the buildings. Tools
and materials are obtained and the tenants learn carpentry skills as they rehab-
ilitate their own buildings. Tenants of several buildings may organize together
to increase the available work force in joint efforts. All that was required was
a knowledge of finance and carpentry, and far less capital than would have been
involved in urban renewal or commercial rehabilitation. The tenant-renovated
buildings are far less susceptible to arson and other abuses. The tenants do
their own upkeep. The buildings once again become viable dwellings.
More importantly, the tenants have the experience of helping themselves,
taking their problems into their own hands. Social improvements are found to
accompany the physical improvements in these neighborhoods. The problems
of the South Bronx could not have been solved by planners sitting in their
Manhatten offices. But they could be solved by the people personally affected
with them, if they were given the opportunity and the necessary assistance.
On the national scale, another problem of major proportions is sweeping
the nation. With the increasing costs of land, energy, fertilizers, and other
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supplies, and the constantly depressed prices paid to farmers by distributors,
wio ship their agricultural products to distant markets, farmers across the
country are facing bankruptcy. Along with the decreased buying power of farmers,
small town businesses are closing at rates not seen since the depression. The
number of individual farms is decreasing at a rate of almost 200, 000 per year.
The average age of farmers is well above 50 and increasing every year. The
average return on investment in farming is about a third that of other industries.
Farmers' demands for parity are unheeded by planners in Washington.
Many farmers quit simply because they can make a much better living
doing something else. Other farmers have offset their losses and paid each year's
higher operating costs by increasing their mortgages with the increasing value of
their land. Last year farmland prices stabilized and, with the banks' unwilling-
ness to loan money against uncertain returns, more farmers faced the threat of
bankruptcy. Some farmers sell their land to urban and foreign investors and
continue as tenant farmers, or simply retire. Others sell parts of their land to
developers and vacation home buyers to pay the costs on the rest. Corporate
farming is increasing with its vast farms, low-paid labor, expensive irrigation and
mechanization techniques, and vertical integration of distribution. However,
corporate farms are consistantly far less productive per acre or per unit of
energy input than family farms, making conversion to such methods of farming
questionable as a national policy.
The federal administration finds its hands tied. Fighting inflation is a
major objective and food costs are a significant factor in. the cost of living.
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Increasing the supply of energy is another objective. Allowing the cost of natural
gas to rise has been seen as a means to encourage the industry to increase the
supply. Unfortunately, the cost of natural gas is the biggest single factor in
agricultural costs as both equipment and fertilizers use it. Government subsidy
programs are too small to be of real help and disproportionately favor large
farms. Government-sponsored research to improve agricultural productivity has
had a pronounced bias towards methods of greater value to large, chemically-based
and mechanically-run operations than to the small farmer with an intimate contact
with the soil. (This has more to do with lobbying and industry subsidies of
research institutions than planning policy or theory.)
In Tennessee and Alabama, small truck farmers, many of them black, had
been facing the same problems as farmers elsewhere. Many of their neighbors
had sold their farms and moved to the cities. Lindsay Jones, a young female
organizer, has been organizing the farmers to solve their own problems. Arrange-
ments have been made with local churches to hold weekly "food fairs" in the church
parking lots. Here the farmers could sell their produce directly to consumers at
prices far less than those charged in large supermarkets and still make more than
twice what the distributors were offering them. The consumers enjoyed fresher
produce and the particular tips the farmers and their wives can offer on prepara-
tion and menus. The farmers get a chance to talk with one another and exchange
ideas on farming. Everyone seems to enjoy the social atmosphere.
In both of these cases, the solutions were arrived at through discussions
with the affected people and achieved through working with them at a personal
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level. The problems were solved with only simple assistance and little or no
public funds as compared with other, less successful programs. There was no
need for major technical analyses or technological developments. More import-
antly, they involved people helping themselves, being the subjects of their cir-
cumstances rather than the objects.
Where problems are strictly technical, involving inanimate objects, as
in designing a bridge or a sewage treatment program, the findings of this thesis
may not have many implications. But even in these cases, where the bridge
serves a community and must be looked at every day by nearby residents, and
the sewage which is created by people's choices and the treatment of which will
be run by public employees, there may be opportunities for confronting real
people and working with them on their problems.
In planning situations of a more social nature, many questions are raised
by this thesis and, hopefully, some implications for changed approaches may be
realized. What is recommended is that where people are involved in an issue,
they ought to be viewed as vital beings, needing to make their own choices, not
objects in a mechanistic model. Further, when seeking to solve problems, an
emphasis should be placed on enabling people affected to solve their own problems
and to make other choices relevant to their own life's circumstances.
When discussing the idea of planners confronting real people, I have been
led to wonder about some traditional planning constituancies such as "the public
interest" and "generations yet unborn". The interests of these groups figure into
the planner's "weighing of values". Two specific questions can be raised. Will
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this weighing of values balance differently based on the information presented?
Should this weighing of values take place under different circumstances? In
cases like the preservation of redwoods in Northern California or virgin wilder-
ness in Alaska, the answer to the first question would seem to be no. The pro-
blem has been and still is the conflict between the interests of two groups. For
one group to be able to exercise the opportunities it desires, the other must be
denied the opportunities it desires. I have not addressed this kind of conflict.
In answer to the second question, the recommendations point to the affirmative.
The weighing of values should not be confined to the planner's mind or models,
but take place in direct discussion with involved actors. If the planner feels
that these people will not equitably consider the interests of others, he should
seek to involve the indicated others in the discussions or, where that is not pos-
sible, to convince those involved of the significance of the interests of others.
To overrule their decision making would mean that one has not been willing to
accept them as subjects, as equals in the decision making process.
Problems with the ideas here proposed, which may necessitate limita-
tions, qualifications, and further elaboration, can be identified by taking the
situation to two obvious extremes; 1. the number of problems involving a single
individual, and 2. the number of individuals involved with a single problem. In
the first case, it must be noted that there are numerous decisions made in the
urban environment every day which, in some way, involve each of us. Meaning-
ful judgments in many of these cases require the intake of much information. If
an individual were to be involved in each issue which these decisions involve, we
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would have the frenetic situation described in Chapter Three where the individ-
ual is constantly being forced to study issues and make judgments. Sometimes
it's just nice to know that things are being taken care of, can function without
one's attention. In the second case, many decisions involve thousands of people.
When the Federal Reserve regulates the money supply, it cannot ask everyone
what it should do. Especially in its case, the element of mystery is essential to
its impact.
In resolving these dilemmas, two issues should be considered: the signifi-
cance of the impact on an individual's life and situation; and the distinction between
knowing that one could affect things if one desired to and actually being forced to
be involved in affecting things. Because of new procedures, in the case of the pro-
posed extension of a subway into the town of Arlington, Massachusetts, individuals
in the town had the opportunity to find out what was happening. When it became clear
to the town government that the people felt that it was of great significance, they
put it on the ballot. The state of Massachusetts has also adjusted the laws concern-
ing the use of eminent domain. People now have more rights in an appeals process
and must be paid a bonus beyond the market valueof their property to offset the
discomfort of being displaced. The scope of this paper does not allow for detailed
discussions of these issues. There is certainly much which could be and which
needs to be said. That must be left for later thinking and discussion.
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"With a scientific civilization that man himself creates according
to plan, a new peril has entered the world: the danger that man
will develop himself only in external actions of altering the environ-
ment, and keep and deal with everything, himself and other human
beings, at this object level of constructive action. This new self-
alienation of man, which can rob him of his own and other's identity
... is the danger of the creator losing himself in his work, the con-
structor in his construction. Man may recoil from completely
transcending himself toward self-produced objectivity, toward con-
structed being; yet he works incessantly at extending this process
of self-objectif ication." (Helmuth Schelsky, quoted in Habermas,
1971, p. 349)
CONC LUSION
In the first chapter, I attempted to assess the adequacy of what I saw as
the most characteristic model of planning. Finding only superficial criticisms
and an indication that, if there were problems, all that was needed was more of
the same approach or similar, I sought to assess the theory at a higher level. In
the second chapter, I sought to assess the model upon which incrementalism was
based. I found it to be based on a mechanistic model of reality which originated
with the natural sciences. In application to the social sciences, a particular
issue pertaining to the behavior of humans arose. I hypothesized that errors sig-
nificant to planning goals would occur when the classic model was applied without
reflection on the consequences of its application to social situations. The error
might be said to be one of false analogy. A model, well suited to specific intentions
and situations is incorrectly applied to a situation other than the one for which it
was developed.
I sought to explore the implications of this problem both through empirical
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evidence and within social and philosophical theory. I concluded that my hypothesis
was correct. I proposed that as a social policy it was undesirable to treat people
as objects and that, where possible, independent, responsible actions by individ-
uals should be encouraged. The final chapter demonstrated some correct and some
incorrect approaches to planning based on the findings of the previous chapters.
In the attempt to assess the problem defining process of planning, this
thesis must be seen as only a small part. My desire was to carry the assessment
to the highest level of philosophical assumptions which I was able to grasp, in an
attempt to expose the biases and values imbedded in planning models and language.
Lower level, more superficial discussions of specific issues in modeling, acting,
and assessing problems, more commonly found in technical and theoretical books
and articles, were passed over. This was not meant to indicate that there is not
much of value remaining to be said on those levels. On the contrary, with the
clarification of the issue presented in this thesis, much-is left to be said particu-
larly at the lower, more specifically application related levels. Similarly, even
higher levels of philosophical discussion, pertaining to our descriptions of reality
and selection of values, were also not attempted. In particular, the issue of
atomistic logic mentioned in Chapter Two, of which mechanistic logic might be
seen as a subset, was not pursued.
Possible adjustments in planning action and theory, in light of the material
presented, were not exhaustively explored. Chapter Five presented some ideas
on how planners might act in taking account of the problem, but the implications for
most planning situations will probably require more thinking.
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As for the argument itself and the hypothesis it supported, I hope it does
not come as a surprise to anyone. It is a sad statement on society if it has to be
reminded of the nature of human existence. It is truly, as Schelsky said, a case
of "the constructor losing himself in his construction. Who can honestly say that
he wants to be treated as an object, that he wants his subjectivity denied? What I
have shown is that such decisions derive from the application of planning models
based on the model of science.
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APPENDIX ONE: LOGIC
The first act of logic is the drawing of a distinction. By doing so, one can
identify a thing or concept (within the boundary of the distinction) from that which
is outside the distinction. This process is carried out in iterative fashion to ident-
ify a multiplicity of objects. Distinctions can be made within other distinctions and
outside of distinctions. A simple example can be seen in the distinctions indicated
with a map. Massachusetts is distinguished within the United States, dividing the
United States into Massachusetts and not Massachusetts. Within Massachusetts we
may draw the distinction for Middlesex County. We may then draw a distinction
for Suffolk County in that part of the distinction, Massachusetts, which has not been
distinguished as Middlesex County. In this way, each of the counties in Massachusetts
is defined and identified. For the identity of elements, it is not necessary that they
be identified one distinction at a time. A foreigner coming to Massachusetts may be
told that Massachusetts has 14 counties and shown a map with their borders. How-
ever, any set of distinctions may be constructed one at a time. For the purposes
of what I intend to explain, it will at times be assumed that sets of distinctions are
created in such sequential fashion. I propose that our logic operates in just such
sequential fashion. In the example of the foreigner, he first divides his concept of
Massachusetts into the concepts of state and counties. He will then learn their
names and locations not simultaneously, but one at a time. Each new county may
be viewed either as a distinction of the whole state or of that portion of the state not
already distinguished as a county. The drawing of distinctions should be clearly
understood as what follows is all elaborations on this process. G. Spencer Brown
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gives a very interesting mathematical treatment of the subject in his book, The
Laws of Form.
I began by saying that logic must begin with the drawing of a distinction. Be-
fore any distinctions exist, there are no concepts; no relationships, no qualities, no
objects. For a concept to have meaning, it must be a distinction. Concepts are
created along with their opposites. The concept, existence, does not have meaning
unless non-existence has meaning. Its meaning is its relationship to (distinction
from) its opposite (complement). This is easily seen with qualities like hot and
cold, light and dark, hard and soft, but applies to all concepts, table and not table,
MIT and not MIT, sight and sightless, good and not good, etc. If everything is poo-
ka, then to say that something is pooka has no meaning, does not make any distinc-
tion. To say that something is neither red nor not red is to say that redness has
no meaning in that context.
The universe which is the subject of discourse is made up of many distinc-
tions. As I said earlier, any set of distinctions can be created sequentially, one
at a time. Thus we may view this world of discourse as a hierarchy or tree. The
base of the tree or the top of the hierarchy is the undifferentiated state. One dis-
tinction is made creating two concepts.
Then each concept (or only one of the .
concepts) is again divided. The pro-
cess may be graphically represented
as at the right., The subdividing of
spaces is a closer analogy, but the figure I
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tree is simpler to portray, graphically. When a distinction is drawn, the two
concepts created need not be given
b no4 b separate names. We simply divide
the previous concept into 'a' and 'not
a.? We can show the dividing of a con-
pept into three 'subconcepts' as in
- figure ii figure ii. There is the danger of
dividing x into a and b by such a process and overlooking that x also includes a
'not a or b'. Goedel's theorem demonstrates that if a and b are not created by the
same distinction, there must be a 'not a or b' or a 'both a and b' or both. The ques-
tion is whether or not a and b are 'exhaustive' of x. It is a common mistake of
deductive logic to say that if something is x and not a, then it is b, where the pro-
cedure for exhaustiveness has not been met.
I have presented the creating of concepts as a hierarchy. The same hier-
archy need not be followed in the reduction of concepts or distinctions. A dis-
tinction breaks a concept into two concepts. Theses two concepts, when brought
together, eliminate the distinction and leave the original concept. However, con-
cepts may also be brought together with concepts formed by other distinctions.
This process creates a new concept
(subsuming the two) which had not
before existed. In figure iii, at d
point a there is one concept, at point 6
d there are eight, while at point f figure iii
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there are five (the right hand concepts of each pair at d have been collected under
one concept at f, while the left hand concepts remain).
The process I have just described is the process of analysis, breaking
concepts down into parts and regrouping them under new concepts. Thus, we may
break the Boston skyline into individual buildings and regroup them into tall and
short, old and new, steeples, apartments, and others, or whatever.
A paradigm is a set of instructions for how distinctions are to be drawn and
under which concepts they are to be regrouped. In Kuhn's classic example, air
was divided into phlogiston and de-phlogisticated air under the old paradigm. The
new paradigm divided air into oxygen and other elements (nitrogen, carbon dioxide,
... ). The regroupings may be regrouped around the concepts of possible and im-
possible, causal and independent, right and wrong, or any set of concepts (or sets
of concepts).
In the formal use of the dialectic, you must bring together the concepts
x and not x. In other words, you must combine the concept in question with what-
ever concept is immediately outside the distinction which holds that concept our
attention is focused on. In the simple hierarchical model, we can see that this
would yield the previous concept, and that should this process be carried out re-
peatedly it would bring us eventually to perception without concepts (immediate or
transcendental). If you just bring concepts together with other concepts seemingly
opposed to them, you will end up with a confusing, inconsistant hodgepodge of con-
cepts, but no clearer vision, free of the predispositions of your conceptual frame-
work.
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In atomistic logic, concepts are broken down into universals ("atoms")
such that any reality confronted may be seen as some combination of these uni-
versals. The most obvious example of this logic is found in sub-atomic physics
where the universe is thought to be composed of various combinations of six
quarks. Likewise, chemistry has its elements. In a language, all ideas are
expressed by combinations of the words in its vocabulary. In the language syntax
discussion at the beginning of Chapter Two, it was implied that all relevant situ-
ations can be modeled by the specified vocabulary (selection of variable) and
syntax, rules governing their possible arrangements (relationships).
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APPENDIX TWO: POSITIVISM
Philosophical Positivism was developed in the 19th century by Auguste
Comte (the father of modern sociology) to counter Hegelianism. The Hegelian
dialectical approach was labelled "negativism" because of its critical approach,
questioning all ideas and values, and thus threatening the existing social order.
The dialectic was a philosophy of change (some said chaos) rather than stability.
Positivism was informed by a need for stability. Its effect was to perpetuate the
existing social order and further entrench it. It rejected notions which could not
be empirically demonstrated (including all imagined human relationships not found
in existing social orders) and sought simply to improve harmony and order. We
may reognize here the pragmatic approach of the incremental planner, solving
"problems" (defined within the existing context) as they appear, improving the
efficiency of the system. Progress was accepted as a given. Man was not seen
as being able to change it, only to facilitate it. (Revolutionaries who threatened
"progress" were best suppressed.) Social Darwinism was an early social theory
using the Positivist approach. Values were seen as relative or even meaningless.
Plans were not good or bad, only more efficient o'r less efficient. Sociology was
established to identify (and thus reify) existing social relationships.
With the unprecedented success of modern science in the late 19th century,
and thenewfascination with science and technology influencing all areas of thought,
Positivism gained widespread acceptance. Rudolph Carnap and a group of scien-
tists, called the Vienna Circle, brought the philosophy of Positivism more care-
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fully in line with acceptable scientific practice, dumping some of its more dog-
matic social applications. Their philosophy, Logical Positivism (later called
Logical Empiricism) has had a significant effect on modern philosophical thought.
The original Positivism asserted simply that only the given was real. Car-
nap refined this position, allowing for future discovery, but rejecting as nonsense
any questions or statements which could not be confirmed or disconfirmed by
appealing to sensory experience. "What gives theoretical meaning to a proposi-
tion is not the attendant images and thoughts, but the possibility of deducing from
it perceptive propositions, in other words, the possibility of verification." (Car-
nap, 1935, ch. 1) The philosophy of ethics was considered a useless exercise.
"This is not an investigation of facts, but pretended investigation
of what is good and what is evil, what is right to do and what is
wrong to do.... From the statement 'Killing is evil' we cannot
deduce any proposition about future experiences. Thus this state-
ment is not verifiable and has no theoretical sense, and the same
thing is true of all other value statements. " (Carnap, in White,
pp. 216-217)
Questions of reality and the rest of metaphysics were also considered
meaningless.
"But this question has no sense, because the reality of anything is
nothing else than the possibility of its being'placed in a certain
system, in this case, in the space-time system of the physical
world, and such a question has sense only if it concerns elements
or parts, not if it concerns the system itself. " (Carnap, in White,
p. 215)
Logical Positivists, as the earlier Empiricists, accepted two kinds of
proof: synthetic, those known by experience, and analytic, shown by logic t o be
tautological - A and B are expressions of the same t 1 ing (as in mathematical
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proofs). In this way, things which, themselves, cannot be experienced can be
analytically deduced from synthetic events.
Like any system, it is subject to Goedel's theorem that any system must
ultimately rest on postulates not provable within that system. Since it intends to
guide human action, it is, itself, that which it denies, metaphysical. How can
you empirically demonstrate the validity of the statement that only that which can
be empirically demonstrated is valid? Only in a dialectical relationship can we
question our mode of questioning.
Do we experience causality? When seeing a falling rock, will Carnap
choose an Aristotelean or Galilean explanation? Why? This issue of verification
is not simple or value free. Carnap himself admits that you can never be 100%
certain, that you can only verify a hypothesis by negative testing, that you might
still find a test which disproves your hypothesis. So it is with synthetic proofs.
Theories and the reality they seek to explain are not one in the same. Theories
are only theories and their validity depends on what we want them to be valid for.
Many individuals will agree to a given explanation of a given event. Thus we say
it has objective validity. But what we are really saying is that we share certain
intentions relative to the observed event. My point is that there are no value free,
universally objective facts. Facts are arrived at in the same way in which we must
arrive at morals. But this need not lead to chaos.. Theoretical validity has always
been a matter of agreement.
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APPENDIX THREE: UTILITARIANISM
In the 18th and 19th centuries the Utilitarians, a group of British philos-
ophers and social theorists, borrowed the practical approach of the early English
Empiricists, the interest in social welfare of the utopians and the language of
the emerging field of economics to create systems of ethics based on social wel-
fare functions. From their empirical background they opposed unearthly and
otherworldly morality. In the utopian tradition they shunned vague generalities
and insisted on getting down to the specific and concrete. Their given was that
every person pursues happiness (pleasure). One might say that senuous enjoy-
ment was an empirical experience which the Utilitarians took to indicate goodness.
Thus pleasure and the greatest possible aggregate of pleasure replaced earlier
religious notions of salvation as the goal of man. This marked an important
transition from man being subservient to moral laws to moral laws being subordi-
nated to human achievement. "It taught that institutions are made for man and
not man for institutions." (Dewey, 1948, p.180)
But Utilitarianism was teleological, happiness was an end to be pursued
(very much like the end of reaping rewards in heaven, only attainable here).
Specific activities and interests were not worthwhile in themselves or as con-
stituents of happiness but only as means to getting pleasures, sensuous enjoyment.
"Since pleasure was an outcome, a result valuable on its own account
independently of the active processes that achieve it, happiness was
a thing to be possessed and held onto. The acquisitive instincts of
man were exaggerated at the expense of the creative.... Labor was
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an evil to be minimized. Security in possession was the chief
thing practically. Material comfort and ease were magnified
in contrast with the pains and risks of experimental creation. "
(Dewey, 1948, p.181)
In connection with the desire for wealth embodied in capitalism, Utilitar-
ianism became an apology for social harm and injustice.
"Utilitarianism gave intellectual confirmation to all those tendencies
which make 'business' not a means of social service and an opportun-
ity for personal growth in creative power but a way of accumulating
the means of private enjoyment. " (Dewey, 1948, p.183)
Cost-benefit analysis borrows its method from the Utilitarians.
Dewey, who is most known for his ideas on education, felt that the Utili-
tarian attitude was especially detrimental in the area of education.
"Education has been traditionally thought of as preparation:
as learning, acquiring certain things because they will later be
useful. The end is remote and education is getting ready, is a
preliminary to something more important to happen later on.
Childhood is only a preparation for adult life, and adult life
for another. Always the future, not the present, has been the
significant thing in education. Acquisition of knowledge and
skill for future use and enjoyment: formation of habits re-
quired later in life in business, good citizenship and pursuit
of science. (Dewey, 1948, pp. 183-184)
Good citizenship was not viewed as a positive quality but as the opposite of
rebelliousness and therefore was seen simply as obedience. The skills needed for
being a good citizen were seen as the skills needed for supporting oneself econom-
ically in society, skills to make one's labor marketable in industrial capitalism.
The child was viewed as incomplete and immature. Rather than being encouraged
to develop his intrinsic potentialities as an autonomous being, the child learned
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to subordinate his being to the goal of becoming an "adult'.- (This sort of lack of
support and acceptance of the young child was viewed by Karen Horney as being
the origin of neurosis. See Neurosis and Human Growth.)
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